The computerized statesman: Further explorations into the escalation of conflict

Abstract

An experiment is described which treats the computer as an interacting member of a dyad in studying the social psychology of conflict. An internation simulation is used to test the effects of threat type (Deterrent vs. Compellent), situation (Hostile vs. Friendly set) and opponent (Man vs. Computer) on compliance. The results indicate that those playing against the computer are more likely to initiate an early pre-emptive attack. Of those that do not attack, though, those playing against the computer are more likely to comply to a threat than those playing another person. Further, compellent threats are less likely to be complied with and are more likely to result in an attack from the person being threatened. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed. Finally, it was found that individual self-perceptions and perceptions of the other vary as a function of the condition.