A Model of Collusion Formation and Measurement in the Open Ascending Bid Auctions in Agricultural Commodity Markets

Dipankar Das
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Abstract

This paper derives a method of measuring the degree of collusion among the bidders in agricultural commodity markets in India and derives the distribution of the change in equilibrium bid prices with respect to time in open ascending price auction when the cartel is there. The important assumption is the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. This means the paper is based on full information model in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation.
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农产品市场公开竞价中串谋的形成与测度模型
本文提出了一种衡量印度农产品市场竞标者相互勾结程度的方法,并推导出了当卡特尔存在时,公开提价拍卖中均衡投标价格随时间变化的分布。重要的假设是投标是重复的,有一组共同的投标人。该理论是根据印度农产品批发市场的行为推导出来的。这意味着本文基于合谋形成的全信息模型。本文首先推导出投标方行为的理论结构,然后推导出合谋形成的测度。
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