Powerful Firms and Monopolizing Conduct

R. Ahdar
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Abstract

New Zealand’s efforts to rein in the anticompetitive conduct of market dominant firms has been disappointing overall. Its track record, in terms of the number of successful challenges, has been dismal. The early cases under the 1986 Act were promising with some notable victories for plaintiffs. But this was not to last. A large part of this chapter details the shadow cast by the Privy Council in the momentous Clear v Telecom saga in the mid-1990s. Their Lordships promulgated a stringent “counterfactual” test for contravening conduct under s 36 (the monopolization prohibition), one that almost spelt the death knell for meaningful enforcement of the section. A major attempt to restore the effectiveness of s 36 and reverse the effect of the London ruling was made by Parliament in 2001, but that proved unavailing. Moreover, the Supreme Court, the replacement for the Privy Council, determined that the counterfactual test ought to be retained. Despite the unabridged severity of the test, a few stubborn victories against monopolizing firms were still recorded. Nonetheless, policymakers have determined that reform is required. One proposal is to revise s 36 to embrace a SLC test. The chapter also considers the dormant intellectual property exemption in s 36. New Zealand’s experience of refusals to deal (“essential faculties” doctrine) and predatory pricing are also analysed.
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强势企业与垄断行为
新西兰在控制市场主导企业的反竞争行为方面的努力总体上令人失望。就成功挑战的数量而言,其过往记录令人沮丧。1986年法案下的早期案件很有希望,原告取得了一些显著的胜利。但这并没有持续太久。本章的大部分内容详细描述了枢密院在20世纪90年代中期重大的Clear v Telecom事件中投下的阴影。他们的法官颁布了一项严格的“反事实”测试,以检测违反第36条(禁止垄断)的行为,这几乎为该条款的有效执行敲响了丧钟。2001年,议会曾试图恢复36号法案的效力,扭转伦敦判决的影响,但结果证明是徒劳的。此外,代替枢密院的最高法院决定应当保留反事实检验。尽管测试的严峻性毫不掩饰,一些反对垄断公司的顽固胜利仍被记录下来。尽管如此,政策制定者已经决定,改革是必要的。一项建议是修改第36条,加入SLC测试。本章还考虑了第36条中的休眠知识产权豁免。本文还分析了新西兰在拒绝交易(“基本能力”学说)和掠夺性定价方面的经验。
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