Onerous Property: Why the Business Corporation is Missing from Property Theory

Amnon Lehavi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Property theory is thriving. Having been long dominated by a disintegrative approach building up on the bundle of rights concept, scholars are now reexamining essentialist models of property, with the right to exclude featuring prominently as property’s prospective core. These theories study various resources, from land to intellectual property, to pinpoint such an essence. Oddly enough, largely missing from these accounts is the most prominent source of wealth in today’s world: the business corporation. While corporate law theory is increasingly looking beyond the nexus of contracts theory to illuminate the firm’s proprietary foundations, property theory has yet to fit the business corporation into its newly integrative framework. The paper argues that this deficiency is not merely a coincidence. In many ways, the business corporation undermines the paradigms of current property theory. To start with, Berle and Means’s underlying notion of divorce of ownership from control in the business corporation seems antagonistic to the owner’s right to exclude or to ‘set the agenda’ for the resource. In addition, while property theory recognizes the need to pool together resources and overcome collective action problems, conventional models of property governance such as residential community associations seem alienated from the power relations and vertical authority within the business firm. Specifically, the setting of a majority shareholder enjoying a control premium alongside owing fiduciary duties to dispersed minority shareholders is allegedly at odds with the horizontal governance assumption in property theory. It may be even unfavorably viewed as reminiscent of obsolete modes of status-based stratification in property, going back to feudalism. This inconvenience does not release, however, property theory from accounting for the core nature of the business corporation. Moreover, the paper argues that once we move from a model of substantive essentialism to one that identifies the institutional and structural traits of property, then the business corporation becomes a much better fit for current property jurisprudence.
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繁重财产:企业公司为何在产权理论中缺失
产权理论正在蓬勃发展。长期以来,学者们一直被建立在权利束概念基础上的分解方法所主导,现在他们正在重新审视财产的本质主义模型,并将排他权作为财产的未来核心。这些理论研究各种资源,从土地到知识产权,以找出这样一个本质。奇怪的是,在这些报告中基本上没有提到当今世界最重要的财富来源:商业公司。虽然公司法理论越来越多地超越合同理论的联系来阐明公司的所有权基础,但财产理论尚未将商业公司纳入其新的综合框架。这篇论文认为,这种缺陷不仅仅是巧合。在许多方面,商业公司破坏了当前产权理论的范式。首先,Berle和Means关于商业公司所有权与控制权分离的基本概念似乎与所有者排除或为资源“设定议程”的权利相抵触。此外,虽然产权理论承认需要汇集资源并克服集体行动问题,但传统的产权治理模式,如住宅社区协会,似乎与商业公司内部的权力关系和垂直权威疏远了。具体而言,大股东享有控制权溢价并对分散的小股东负有信托义务的设定据称与产权理论中的横向治理假设不一致。它甚至可能被认为是对封建时代的过时的、以地位为基础的财产分层模式的回忆。然而,这种不便并不能使产权理论脱离对商业公司核心性质的核算。此外,本文认为,一旦我们从实体本质主义模式转向识别财产的制度和结构特征的模式,那么商业公司就变得更适合当前的财产法学。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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