Inconsistency in Antitrust

Ramsi Woodcock
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Antitrust prohibits cartels from charging monopoly prices but does not prohibit monopolies from charging monopoly prices. Antitrust does not ban monopoly pricing by monopolies because it thinks that unless a monopoly takes affirmative action to exclude competitors, competitors will enter the market to drive prices back down to competitive levels. Curiously, antitrust does not explain why the same effect should not drive cartel prices to competitive levels. This article argues that this inconsistency in antitrust arises because antitrust has failed to realize that mere ownership of essential inputs is itself enough to exclude competitors. This is what permits both cartels and monopolies to maintain high prices and exclude competitors without taking affirmative steps to exclude. This article argues that one response to this inconsistency would be to extend the ban on monopoly pricing to include monopolies.
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反垄断的不一致性
反托拉斯法禁止卡特尔收取垄断价格,但不禁止垄断企业收取垄断价格。反垄断之所以不禁止垄断定价,是因为它认为,除非垄断企业采取平权措施排除竞争对手,否则竞争对手将进入市场,将价格拉回竞争水平。奇怪的是,反托拉斯法并没有解释为什么同样的效应不应该推动卡特尔价格达到竞争水平。本文认为,反垄断之所以出现这种不一致,是因为反垄断未能认识到,仅仅拥有基本投入本身就足以排除竞争对手。这使得卡特尔和垄断企业能够维持高价格并排除竞争对手,而无需采取积极的排除措施。本文认为,对这种不一致的一种回应是将对垄断定价的禁令扩大到包括垄断。
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