When Labor Enforcement and Immigration Enforcement Collide: Deterring Worker Complaints Worsens Workplace Safety

Abstract

Regulatory agencies overseeing the labor market often rely on worker complaints to target their enforcement resources. This system might be counterproductive if the workers at risk of poor working conditions also face high barriers to complain. We examine the implications of complaint-based enforcement in the context of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). We provide descriptive evidence that Hispanic workers face higher barriers to complain: workplaces with large shares of Hispanic workers have higher injury rates but issue fewer complaints to OSHA. We show that workers' willingness to complain causally affects the job hazards they face. At workplaces with large shares of Hispanic workers, counties’ participation in an immigration enforcement program reduced complaints to OSHA, but increased injuries. Our results highlight that using complaints to direct regulatory enforcement can exacerbate existing inequalities when workers face differential barriers to complain.