After the Civil War, the Democratic party carried an important electoral penalty from being associated with the war. To deal with this penalty, the party took increasingly anti-immigration positions to compete with Republicans. This led some Republican strongholds such as California to become competitive and also forced Republicans to embrace stricter immigration proposals. In this paper, we argue that adopting anti-immigration and raising awareness against immigration made California increasingly competitive in electoral terms. This electoral competitiveness can serve to explain the genesis of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.
{"title":"Postbellum Electoral Politics in California and the Genesis of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882","authors":"Vincent J. Geloso, Linan Peng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3925085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925085","url":null,"abstract":"After the Civil War, the Democratic party carried an important electoral penalty from being associated with the war. To deal with this penalty, the party took increasingly anti-immigration positions to compete with Republicans. This led some Republican strongholds such as California to become competitive and also forced Republicans to embrace stricter immigration proposals. In this paper, we argue that adopting anti-immigration and raising awareness against immigration made California increasingly competitive in electoral terms. This electoral competitiveness can serve to explain the genesis of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134185482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a change in immigration policy whereby the UK unexpectedly annulled visa requirements for nationals of new member states of the EU. We find that the newly arrived migrants from these countries were likelier to be employed in lower-ranking occupations, but this greater propensity erodes after accounting for the spatial distribution of job opportunities at the migrant's arrival and region-related demand factors during their job search. They were more regionally dispersed than their compatriots who had needed a visa to enter the UK while possessing comparable measures of human capital used to assess visa applications as them. The influence of labour market related factors also largely accounts for gaps in the occupational distributions of migrants and that of the UK-born. Many of the newly arrived without visa requirements may have downgraded occupations discriminately, with their average weekly earnings exceeding that of their counterparts in higher-ranking occupations despite working in a lower-ranking occupation.
{"title":"Do Open Borders Lead to Different Types of Migrants?","authors":"Z. Kone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889901","url":null,"abstract":"We study a change in immigration policy whereby the UK unexpectedly annulled visa requirements for nationals of new member states of the EU. We find that the newly arrived migrants from these countries were likelier to be employed in lower-ranking occupations, but this greater propensity erodes after accounting for the spatial distribution of job opportunities at the migrant's arrival and region-related demand factors during their job search. They were more regionally dispersed than their compatriots who had needed a visa to enter the UK while possessing comparable measures of human capital used to assess visa applications as them. The influence of labour market related factors also largely accounts for gaps in the occupational distributions of migrants and that of the UK-born. Many of the newly arrived without visa requirements may have downgraded occupations discriminately, with their average weekly earnings exceeding that of their counterparts in higher-ranking occupations despite working in a lower-ranking occupation.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129367654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We revisit the old question of how immigration affects the welfare of native workers. As opposed to most of the previous literature, we look at this question through the lens of firms, as they play a crucial role in immigration and are massively heterogeneous even within sectors. We use a novel establishment-level dataset from Germany to document a new dimension of firm heterogeneity: Large firms spend a higher share of their wage bill on immigrants than small firms. We show analytically and quantitatively that ignoring this heterogeneity in immigrant share leads to biased welfare gains from immigration. To do so, we set up and estimate a quantitative model where heterogeneous firms choose their immigrant share and validate the model using an instrumental variables strategy. We then use the model to quantify the welfare effects and the bias of a 20% increase in the number of immigrants in Germany as observed between 2011 and 2017. The welfare of natives increases both through higher wages and profits, and lower prices, with aggregate welfare gains of $4 billion for native workers and $15 billion for firm owners. Immigration leads native workers to reallocate within-sector across firms, a key mechanism that explains the source of the bias. If we estimate the model without firm-level data on immigrant employment, we would underestimate the welfare gains for native workers by 11%.
{"title":"Firm Heterogeneity and the Impact of Immigration: Evidence from German Establishments","authors":"Agostina Brinatti, N. Morales","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3881995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3881995","url":null,"abstract":"We revisit the old question of how immigration affects the welfare of native workers. As opposed to most of the previous literature, we look at this question through the lens of firms, as they play a crucial role in immigration and are massively heterogeneous even within sectors. We use a novel establishment-level dataset from Germany to document a new dimension of firm heterogeneity: Large firms spend a higher share of their wage bill on immigrants than small firms. We show analytically and quantitatively that ignoring this heterogeneity in immigrant share leads to biased welfare gains from immigration. To do so, we set up and estimate a quantitative model where heterogeneous firms choose their immigrant share and validate the model using an instrumental variables strategy. We then use the model to quantify the welfare effects and the bias of a 20% increase in the number of immigrants in Germany as observed between 2011 and 2017. The welfare of natives increases both through higher wages and profits, and lower prices, with aggregate welfare gains of $4 billion for native workers and $15 billion for firm owners. Immigration leads native workers to reallocate within-sector across firms, a key mechanism that explains the source of the bias. If we estimate the model without firm-level data on immigrant employment, we would underestimate the welfare gains for native workers by 11%.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132521683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the effects of large scale forced migration on educational attainment of individuals who were in the school going age when they were forced to migrate. When British left the colonized Indian subcontinent in 1947, two independent states were created: India and Pakistan. Millions of individuals found themselves on the wrong side of the border leading to mass scale violence and migration. I rely on a differences-in-differences approach to establish the causality of the estimates. Using Pakistan's Census data from 1973, I first show that educational outcomes between migrants and natives do not differ for individuals who were out of school going age in 1947. I subsequently show that individuals of school going age, who were born in India and migrated to Pakistan, have a higher likelihood to attain more education than their native counterparts. This is despite the fact that these young migrants and their families were suddenly displaced and immigrated into a newly found country with limited resources at its disposal. These results are driven by a higher value being placed on education and an access to better educational environment.
{"title":"Mass Involuntary Migration and Educational Outcomes","authors":"Abubakr Ayesh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3878191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3878191","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of large scale forced migration on educational attainment of individuals who were in the school going age when they were forced to migrate. When British left the colonized Indian subcontinent in 1947, two independent states were created: India and Pakistan. Millions of individuals found themselves on the wrong side of the border leading to mass scale violence and migration. I rely on a differences-in-differences approach to establish the causality of the estimates. Using Pakistan's Census data from 1973, I first show that educational outcomes between migrants and natives do not differ for individuals who were out of school going age in 1947. I subsequently show that individuals of school going age, who were born in India and migrated to Pakistan, have a higher likelihood to attain more education than their native counterparts. This is despite the fact that these young migrants and their families were suddenly displaced and immigrated into a newly found country with limited resources at its disposal. These results are driven by a higher value being placed on education and an access to better educational environment.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"200 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129919528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we examine the case of Vietnam as an example of this phenomenon. In Vietnam, the World Bank Indicators show a self-employment rate of 60% among men in 2008, whereas the United States rate is less than 15%. This wide gap between the two countries even greater than that between Mexico and the U.S. (Fairlie and Woodruff, 2007). We use census microdata from Vietnam and the U.S. as well as an understanding of the economic systems in the two countries to understand the differences in the self-employment rate of the Vietnamese in Vietnam versus Vietnamese immigrants in the U.S. and to give some insight into the nature of self-employment in the two countries. We utilize two analysis methods on various variables to investigate the differences in the rates of self- employment. This diversified analysis enables one to understand the differences between the two economies and the differences between Vietnamese workers in Vietnam and Vietnamese immigrants in terms of self-employment. Through these analyses, we can explain some parts of the differences.
在本文中，我们以越南为例来研究这一现象。世界银行的指标显示，2008年越南男性的自雇率为60%，而美国的自雇率不到15%。这两个国家之间的差距甚至比墨西哥和美国之间的差距更大(Fairlie and Woodruff, 2007)。我们使用来自越南和美国的人口普查微观数据，以及对两国经济制度的理解，来了解越南越南人与美国越南移民的自雇率的差异，并对两国自雇的本质有一些深入的了解。我们利用两种不同变量的分析方法来研究个体就业率的差异。这种多样化的分析使人们能够理解两国经济之间的差异，以及在越南的越南工人和越南移民在自营职业方面的差异。通过这些分析，我们可以解释部分差异。
{"title":"Vietnamese Immigrant Entrepreneurship: A Comparison of Self-Employment in Vietnam and the United States","authors":"Teepakorn Opas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920426","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the case of Vietnam as an example of this phenomenon. In Vietnam, the World Bank Indicators show a self-employment rate of 60% among men in 2008, whereas the United States rate is less than 15%. This wide gap between the two countries even greater than that between Mexico and the U.S. (Fairlie and Woodruff, 2007). We use census microdata from Vietnam and the U.S. as well as an understanding of the economic systems in the two countries to understand the differences in the self-employment rate of the Vietnamese in Vietnam versus Vietnamese immigrants in the U.S. and to give some insight into the nature of self-employment in the two countries. We utilize two analysis methods on various variables to investigate the differences in the rates of self- employment. This diversified analysis enables one to understand the differences between the two economies and the differences between Vietnamese workers in Vietnam and Vietnamese immigrants in terms of self-employment. Through these analyses, we can explain some parts of the differences.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"13 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113964385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a novel theory that immigrants facilitate innovation and entrepreneurship by being willing and able to invest in new skills. Immigrants whose human capital is not immediately transferable to the host country face lower opportunity costs of investing in new skills or methods and will be more flexible in their human capital investments than observationally equivalent natives. Areas with large numbers of immigrants may therefore lead to more entrepreneurship and innovation, even among natives. We provide empirical evidence from the United States that is consistent with the theory's predictions.
{"title":"On Immigration and Native Entrepreneurship","authors":"H. Duleep, David A. Jaeger, Peter McHenry","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3808451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808451","url":null,"abstract":"We present a novel theory that immigrants facilitate innovation and entrepreneurship by being willing and able to invest in new skills. Immigrants whose human capital is not immediately transferable to the host country face lower opportunity costs of investing in new skills or methods and will be more flexible in their human capital investments than observationally equivalent natives. Areas with large numbers of immigrants may therefore lead to more entrepreneurship and innovation, even among natives. We provide empirical evidence from the United States that is consistent with the theory's predictions.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128850730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The disparate treatment of capital and labor reflects one of globalization’s central asymmetries: the law often allows financial capital, but not people, to move freely across borders. Yet scholars have largely neglected the intersection of these two regimes, the legal restrictions on migrants’ capital, particularly when the migrants themselves are deemed illegal. These restrictions on migrants’ capital abound even while migratory capital generally faces few such restrictions. As such, capital controls may operate as migrant controls. This Article canvasses established and emerging examples of capital controls as migrant controls and the pressing legal questions these controls raise. Capital is guarded when remittances are taxed, particularly when the taxation is explicitly conditioned on immigration status. Capital is expelled when capital receipts, such as Social Security benefits, are made contingent on departure and non-residency. And capital is marginalized when financial laws require particular identity and immigration documents on penalty of exclusion from key financial services. As I describe, such taxation, receipt contingencies, and identity requirements often distinguish on the basis of immigration status and implicate core questions in constitutional and immigration law. These questions include the scope of traditional state powers such as taxation; how such controls create unconstitutional choices and conditions; and how statutory and administrative ambiguities in banking law may marginalize migrants. More generally, these controls contribute to our understanding of who—Congress, federal agencies, municipalities and states, or social movements outside the law—controls, and who may legally control, American migration.
{"title":"Capital Controls as Migrant Controls","authors":"Shayak Sarkar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3781043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3781043","url":null,"abstract":"The disparate treatment of capital and labor reflects one of globalization’s central asymmetries: the law often allows financial capital, but not people, to move freely across borders. Yet scholars have largely neglected the intersection of these two regimes, the legal restrictions on migrants’ capital, particularly when the migrants themselves are deemed illegal. These restrictions on migrants’ capital abound even while migratory capital generally faces few such restrictions. As such, capital controls may operate as migrant controls. \u0000 \u0000This Article canvasses established and emerging examples of capital controls as migrant controls and the pressing legal questions these controls raise. Capital is guarded when remittances are taxed, particularly when the taxation is explicitly conditioned on immigration status. Capital is expelled when capital receipts, such as Social Security benefits, are made contingent on departure and non-residency. And capital is marginalized when financial laws require particular identity and immigration documents on penalty of exclusion from key financial services. \u0000 \u0000As I describe, such taxation, receipt contingencies, and identity requirements often distinguish on the basis of immigration status and implicate core questions in constitutional and immigration law. These questions include the scope of traditional state powers such as taxation; how such controls create unconstitutional choices and conditions; and how statutory and administrative ambiguities in banking law may marginalize migrants. More generally, these controls contribute to our understanding of who—Congress, federal agencies, municipalities and states, or social movements outside the law—controls, and who may legally control, American migration.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127661958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract. This paper illustrates the intergenerational transmission of the gender gap in education among first and second-generation immigrants. Using the Current Population Survey (1994-2018), we find that the difference in female-male education persists from the home country to the new environment. A one standard deviation increase of the ancestral country’s female-male difference in schooling is associated with 17.2% and 2.5% of a standard deviation increase in the gender gap among first and second generations, respectively. Since gender perspective in education uncovers a new channel for cultural transmission among families, we interpret the findings as evidence of cultural persistence among first generations and partial cultural assimilation of second generations. Moreover, Disaggregation into country-groups reveals different paths for this transmission: descendants of immigrants of lower-income countries show fewer attachments to the gender opinions of their home country. Average local education of natives can facilitate the acculturation process. Immigrants residing in states with higher education reveal a lower tendency to follow their home country attitudes regarding the gender gap. Keywords. Gender Gap, Immigration, Human Capital, Education, Assimilation. JEL. J15, J16, Z13, I20.
{"title":"Intergenerational Transmission of Culture Among Immigrants: Gender Gap in Education Among First and Second Generations","authors":"H. Noghanibehambari, N. Tavassoli, F. Noghani","doi":"10.1453/JEPE.V7I4.2145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1453/JEPE.V7I4.2145","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract. This paper illustrates the intergenerational transmission of the gender gap in education among first and second-generation immigrants. Using the Current Population Survey (1994-2018), we find that the difference in female-male education persists from the home country to the new environment. A one standard deviation increase of the ancestral country’s female-male difference in schooling is associated with 17.2% and 2.5% of a standard deviation increase in the gender gap among first and second generations, respectively. Since gender perspective in education uncovers a new channel for cultural transmission among families, we interpret the findings as evidence of cultural persistence among first generations and partial cultural assimilation of second generations. Moreover, Disaggregation into country-groups reveals different paths for this transmission: descendants of immigrants of lower-income countries show fewer attachments to the gender opinions of their home country. Average local education of natives can facilitate the acculturation process. Immigrants residing in states with higher education reveal a lower tendency to follow their home country attitudes regarding the gender gap. Keywords. Gender Gap, Immigration, Human Capital, Education, Assimilation. JEL. J15, J16, Z13, I20.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115360519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory agencies overseeing the labor market often rely on worker complaints to target their enforcement resources. This system might be counterproductive if the workers at risk of poor working conditions also face high barriers to complain. We examine the implications of complaint-based enforcement in the context of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). We provide descriptive evidence that Hispanic workers face higher barriers to complain: workplaces with large shares of Hispanic workers have higher injury rates but issue fewer complaints to OSHA. We show that workers' willingness to complain causally affects the job hazards they face. At workplaces with large shares of Hispanic workers, counties’ participation in an immigration enforcement program reduced complaints to OSHA, but increased injuries. Our results highlight that using complaints to direct regulatory enforcement can exacerbate existing inequalities when workers face differential barriers to complain.
{"title":"When Labor Enforcement and Immigration Enforcement Collide: Deterring Worker Complaints Worsens Workplace Safety","authors":"Matthew S. Johnson, A. Grittner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3943441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3943441","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory agencies overseeing the labor market often rely on worker complaints to target their enforcement resources. This system might be counterproductive if the workers at risk of poor working conditions also face high barriers to complain. We examine the implications of complaint-based enforcement in the context of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). We provide descriptive evidence that Hispanic workers face higher barriers to complain: workplaces with large shares of Hispanic workers have higher injury rates but issue fewer complaints to OSHA. We show that workers' willingness to complain causally affects the job hazards they face. At workplaces with large shares of Hispanic workers, counties’ participation in an immigration enforcement program reduced complaints to OSHA, but increased injuries. Our results highlight that using complaints to direct regulatory enforcement can exacerbate existing inequalities when workers face differential barriers to complain.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131406413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 23 September 2020 – at the time of what seemed (but turned out not) to be the photo finish of the negotiations of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – the European Commission proposed the New Pact on Migration and Asylum with the appended package of new legislative proposal. The aim of this article is to look at the financial implications of the Migration Pact and examine whether the ambitions of the new Pact are reflected in the 2021-2027 MFF. The text will try to respond to two questions. Firstly, it will examine whether the Migration Pact generates new costs for the EU and its Member States and whether these costs have been calculated into the MFF.; and secondly, it will consider whether the creation of additional costs by the Migration Pact could interfere with its successful adoption and implementation.
{"title":"Financial Implications of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Will the Next Multiannual Financial Framework Cover the Costs?","authors":"Iris GOLDNER LANG","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3781080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3781080","url":null,"abstract":"On 23 September 2020 – at the time of what seemed (but turned out not) to be the photo finish of the negotiations of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – the European Commission proposed the New Pact on Migration and Asylum with the appended package of new legislative proposal. The aim of this article is to look at the financial implications of the Migration Pact and examine whether the ambitions of the new Pact are reflected in the 2021-2027 MFF. The text will try to respond to two questions. Firstly, it will examine whether the Migration Pact generates new costs for the EU and its Member States and whether these costs have been calculated into the MFF.; and secondly, it will consider whether the creation of additional costs by the Migration Pact could interfere with its successful adoption and implementation.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124232647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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