What Does Japanese Corporate Governance Reform Mean?

Hiroyasu Omura
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Abstract

In Japan, since 2013, Japanese corporate governance reform has been developed by Japanese Government initiatives. This paper provides a theoretical framework for understanding what Japanese corporate governance reform means for Japanese companies by an application of agency theory. Corporate governance is a structure which determines how shareholders delegate corporate control to managers and monitor managers’ business executions. Debates on corporate governance finally end in how we should resolve agency problems which decide what is the best measures to maximize corporate value by reducing agency costs deriving from an agency relationship between shareholders and managers. New Japanese reform further develops previously introduced measures for improving corporate governance in order to reduce agency costs. Now some changes in corporate financial results are recognized in stewardship reports by institutional investors. This reform is facilitated by an introduction of Japanese Stewardship Code and leveraged by a collaboration between Corporate Governance Code and Japanese Stewardship Code to seek a long-term corporate growth. Key to success to a corporate governance reform is a synchronized collaboration between these two codes, which puts burdens of execution on institutional investors who take stewardship activities effectuating a governance reform. Agency theory focused on principal costs provides us with interpretation of the reform and implication of possible changes in corporate governance and their solutions. One possible hint for solutions is disclosure of stewardship activities including engagement activities by institutional investors.
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日本公司治理改革意味着什么?
在日本,自2013年以来,日本公司治理改革一直是由日本政府推动的。本文运用代理理论为理解日本公司治理改革对日本公司的意义提供了一个理论框架。公司治理是一种结构,它决定了股东如何将公司控制权委托给经理并监督经理的业务执行。关于公司治理的争论最终以如何解决代理问题而告终,代理问题决定了什么是通过降低股东和管理者之间的代理关系产生的代理成本来实现公司价值最大化的最佳措施。新的日本改革进一步发展了以前引入的改善公司治理的措施,以降低代理成本。现在,机构投资者在管理报告中认识到公司财务结果的一些变化。日本管理守则的引入促进了这一改革,并通过公司治理守则和日本管理守则之间的合作来促进这一改革,以寻求公司的长期增长。公司治理改革成功的关键是这两种准则之间的同步协作,这将执行的负担放在机构投资者身上,这些机构投资者采取了实施治理改革的管理活动。以本金成本为中心的代理理论为我们提供了对公司治理改革及其可能变化的含义和解决方案的解释。解决方案的一个可能线索是披露管理活动,包括机构投资者的参与活动。
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