Conclusion to Part III

Abstract

Why did the Bush and Obama administrations fixate on ineffective strategies? Confirmation bias reinforced the Bush administration’s belief that the war was over, that a small military effort could defeat the remnants of the Taliban, and that the international community could pick up the burden of reconstruction. Officials emphasized reports of progress within political, military, and economic silos and discounted evidence of mounting problems. The Obama administration’s belief that the Taliban would be unwilling to fight other Afghans and its frustration over the Karzai government’s endemic corruption, coupled with the Pentagon’s narrative about the ANSF’s readiness, reinforced the withdrawal timeline. Evidence mounted that the Afghan government was losing legitimacy, and the ANSF was corrupt and poorly led. The Taliban remained resilient with their sanctuaries in Pakistan and local support in Afghanistan intact. Still, the Obama administration would not reexamine the drawdown timeline until the disaster became apparent at the end of 2014. Poor strategic empathy compounded the effects of confirmation bias in both administrations. Civilian and military officials, focused in their silos, never addressed the cross-cutting issues that jeopardized US aims. Defense officials had to use subtle language about risks to avoid running afoul of the White House, but no one in Congress picked up the nuances....