{"title":"The Decisive Victory Paradigm Undermines Strategy for Irregular War","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the U.S. national security establishment is organized intellectually and bureaucratically around the ability to wage conventional war. In irregular war, factors for success might differ from conventional war. With counterinsurgencies, reducing tangible support for the insurgency and winning the battle for legitimacy are the two critical factors for success.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter argues that the U.S. national security establishment is organized intellectually and bureaucratically around the ability to wage conventional war. In irregular war, factors for success might differ from conventional war. With counterinsurgencies, reducing tangible support for the insurgency and winning the battle for legitimacy are the two critical factors for success.