{"title":"The Postwar Intelligence Debate and the CIA","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the dissolution of the World War II–era U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. Facing competition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services, and without a strong political patron, the OSS was not maintained after the war as many of its members wished. Beyond desiring that the OSS continue to function, many of its members articulated a clear ideology of intelligence, calling for a centralized, activist agency that could both gather secret intelligence and conduct covert warfare. This model was at odds with the collection and coordination focus of the early Central Intelligence Agency. While initially unsuccessful, the OSS vision ultimately triumphed in part because of the cultivation of key members of the press. The press was especially important owing to its criticism of the CIA for failures of prediction while remaining silent on covert operations; thus, failed operations did not impede advocates for covert action, while advocates for an agency focused on collection and analysis labored under unrealistic expectations.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Rising Clamor","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter examines the dissolution of the World War II–era U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. Facing competition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services, and without a strong political patron, the OSS was not maintained after the war as many of its members wished. Beyond desiring that the OSS continue to function, many of its members articulated a clear ideology of intelligence, calling for a centralized, activist agency that could both gather secret intelligence and conduct covert warfare. This model was at odds with the collection and coordination focus of the early Central Intelligence Agency. While initially unsuccessful, the OSS vision ultimately triumphed in part because of the cultivation of key members of the press. The press was especially important owing to its criticism of the CIA for failures of prediction while remaining silent on covert operations; thus, failed operations did not impede advocates for covert action, while advocates for an agency focused on collection and analysis labored under unrealistic expectations.