{"title":"List of Significant CIA and Press Figures","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131762145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the increasingly fraught press environment of the 1960s and its effect on the CIA, as the Cold War consensus slowly began to unravel. In an effort to garner support, the Central Intelligence Agency began more systematic efforts to provide briefings to members of the press. The New York Times Washington Bureau, first under James Reston and then under Tom Wicker, had a standing arrangement for briefings by the CIA. Once that arrangement ended, the New York Times published an unprecedented series of articles exploring the CIA’s activities. In 1967 a radical publication, Ramparts, revealed the agency’s decades-long foray into supporting private organizations and student groups to use culture as a weapon in the Cold War. The CIA survived each crisis, but its position continued to deteriorate, and there emerged a growing faction in the press skeptical of the agency and national security arguments against publishing stories.
{"title":"The Fracture of the 1960s","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the increasingly fraught press environment of the 1960s and its effect on the CIA, as the Cold War consensus slowly began to unravel. In an effort to garner support, the Central Intelligence Agency began more systematic efforts to provide briefings to members of the press. The New York Times Washington Bureau, first under James Reston and then under Tom Wicker, had a standing arrangement for briefings by the CIA. Once that arrangement ended, the New York Times published an unprecedented series of articles exploring the CIA’s activities. In 1967 a radical publication, Ramparts, revealed the agency’s decades-long foray into supporting private organizations and student groups to use culture as a weapon in the Cold War. The CIA survived each crisis, but its position continued to deteriorate, and there emerged a growing faction in the press skeptical of the agency and national security arguments against publishing stories.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126554553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the dissolution of the World War II–era U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. Facing competition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services, and without a strong political patron, the OSS was not maintained after the war as many of its members wished. Beyond desiring that the OSS continue to function, many of its members articulated a clear ideology of intelligence, calling for a centralized, activist agency that could both gather secret intelligence and conduct covert warfare. This model was at odds with the collection and coordination focus of the early Central Intelligence Agency. While initially unsuccessful, the OSS vision ultimately triumphed in part because of the cultivation of key members of the press. The press was especially important owing to its criticism of the CIA for failures of prediction while remaining silent on covert operations; thus, failed operations did not impede advocates for covert action, while advocates for an agency focused on collection and analysis labored under unrealistic expectations.
{"title":"The Postwar Intelligence Debate and the CIA","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.5","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the dissolution of the World War II–era U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. Facing competition from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services, and without a strong political patron, the OSS was not maintained after the war as many of its members wished. Beyond desiring that the OSS continue to function, many of its members articulated a clear ideology of intelligence, calling for a centralized, activist agency that could both gather secret intelligence and conduct covert warfare. This model was at odds with the collection and coordination focus of the early Central Intelligence Agency. While initially unsuccessful, the OSS vision ultimately triumphed in part because of the cultivation of key members of the press. The press was especially important owing to its criticism of the CIA for failures of prediction while remaining silent on covert operations; thus, failed operations did not impede advocates for covert action, while advocates for an agency focused on collection and analysis labored under unrealistic expectations.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132078723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the public presence of the Central Intelligence Agency after its high-profile successes in Iran and Guatemala, related in the previous chapter. An effort to oust Sukarno in Indonesia failed, and the CIA was troubled by the general political environment of the 1950s, driven by fears that the Soviet Union was technologically ahead of the United States. Though able to weather the crisis that ensued when a U-2 surveillance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, the CIA’s public and humiliating failure to oust Fidel Castro in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion undermined the CIA’s reputation for effectiveness. Though not a reason for the failure of the invasion, the press’s coverage of the anti-Castro operation demonstrated that press attitudes toward the agency had begun to shift as a younger generation of reporters and managers more willing to question the CIA emerged on the scene.
{"title":"The Increasing Public Profile of the CIA","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.7","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the public presence of the Central Intelligence Agency after its high-profile successes in Iran and Guatemala, related in the previous chapter. An effort to oust Sukarno in Indonesia failed, and the CIA was troubled by the general political environment of the 1950s, driven by fears that the Soviet Union was technologically ahead of the United States. Though able to weather the crisis that ensued when a U-2 surveillance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, the CIA’s public and humiliating failure to oust Fidel Castro in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion undermined the CIA’s reputation for effectiveness. Though not a reason for the failure of the invasion, the press’s coverage of the anti-Castro operation demonstrated that press attitudes toward the agency had begun to shift as a younger generation of reporters and managers more willing to question the CIA emerged on the scene.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125194955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the investigations that began following the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency operated an illegal domestic surveillance system. Three investigations emerged: a blue-ribbon presidential commission chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, a Senate Select Committee chaired by Frank Church (D-ID), and a House Select Committee chaired by Otis Pike (D-NY). The investigations were quickly sidetracked by stories about the CIA’s involvement in assassinations; ultimately, a main area of focus for the Church Committee in particular would be assassinations. The media environment reflected the tremendous controversy over the CIA and the increasingly partisan nature of politics and news coverage, as some commentators were divided between supporting the CIA and criticizing the investigations, whereas others were ambivalent and uncertain about what should be done. Even during this tumultuous period, the press was still willing to cooperate with the CIA when Director of Central Intelligence William Colby requested their cooperation in suppressing a story about the CIA’s efforts to raise a sunken Soviet submarine.
{"title":"The Year of Intelligence Begins","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the investigations that began following the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency operated an illegal domestic surveillance system. Three investigations emerged: a blue-ribbon presidential commission chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, a Senate Select Committee chaired by Frank Church (D-ID), and a House Select Committee chaired by Otis Pike (D-NY). The investigations were quickly sidetracked by stories about the CIA’s involvement in assassinations; ultimately, a main area of focus for the Church Committee in particular would be assassinations. The media environment reflected the tremendous controversy over the CIA and the increasingly partisan nature of politics and news coverage, as some commentators were divided between supporting the CIA and criticizing the investigations, whereas others were ambivalent and uncertain about what should be done. Even during this tumultuous period, the press was still willing to cooperate with the CIA when Director of Central Intelligence William Colby requested their cooperation in suppressing a story about the CIA’s efforts to raise a sunken Soviet submarine.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122426338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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