Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs

Yuval Heller, D. Sturrock
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

We present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non-enforceable communication about future actions to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, each player makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging, and show that these intermediate costs induce second-best optimal outcomes.
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承诺与内生违约成本
我们提出了一种新的理论机制,解释了关于未来行动的非强制性沟通能力,以提高效率。我们研究了一个双人合作游戏,在选择共同项目的努力水平之前,每个参与者都对他们的伙伴做出一个关于自己未来努力的廉价承诺。我们允许代理人因食言而付出心理代价。我们证明了进化过程中有一种强烈的倾向,即选择那些承担违约中间成本的代理人,并表明这些中间成本会导致次优结果。
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