Managing Contentious Collective Action

C. Hummel
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Abstract

Chapter 5 develops an ethnography of street vendors, their organizations, and the city officials who they interact with in the city of La Paz, Bolivia. The chapter is based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the city over four research trips in 2012, 2014 to 2015, 2018, and 2019 as well as administrative data on 31,906 street vending licenses in the city. Fieldwork included interviews, participant observation at dozens of meetings between bureaucrats and organized vendors, ride-alongs with the Municipal Guard, a street vendor survey, working as a street vendor in a clothing market, and selling wedding services with a street vendor cooperative. The theory’s observable implications are illustrated with ethnographic evidence, survey results, and license data from La Paz. I discuss how street vending has changed in the city and how officials have intervened in collective action decisions as the informal sector grew. The chapter demonstrates that officials increased benefits to organized vendors as the costs of regulating markets increased. Additionally, the leaders that take advantage of these offers tend to have more resources than their colleagues, and as the offers increased, so did the level of organization among the city’s street vendors. The chapter also discusses the many trade-offs that officials make in implementing different policies, and how officials manage the often combative organizations that they encourage.
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管理有争议的集体诉讼
第五章发展了玻利维亚拉巴斯市街头小贩、他们的组织和与他们互动的城市官员的民族志。本章基于在2012年、2014年至2015年、2018年和2019年四次研究旅行中在该市进行的为期14个月的民族志田野调查,以及该市31906个街头贩卖许可证的行政数据。实地工作包括采访,在官员和有组织的摊贩之间的数十次会议中参与观察,与市政警卫一起乘车,街头摊贩调查,在服装市场担任街头摊贩,并与街头摊贩合作出售婚礼服务。该理论可观察到的含义用人种学证据、调查结果和拉巴斯的许可证数据来说明。我讨论了街头贩卖如何在城市中发生变化,以及随着非正式部门的发展,官员如何干预集体行动决策。这一章表明,随着监管市场的成本增加,官员增加了有组织的供应商的利益。此外,利用这些优惠的领导者往往比他们的同事拥有更多的资源,随着优惠的增加,城市街头小贩的组织水平也随之提高。本章还讨论了官员在实施不同政策时所做的许多权衡,以及官员如何管理他们所鼓励的经常好斗的组织。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Why Do Informal Workers Organize? State Intervention in Collective Action Street Markets in La Paz and São Paulo Informal Work in Numbers Conclusion
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