Effect of Institutional Ownership and Managerial Ownership on Corporate Financial Performance: Mediating Earning Management.

L. Lisandri, Fahmi Rizani, Soelistijono Boedhi, Akhmad Yafiz Syam
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This study was intended to obtain empirical evidence of the effect of Institutional Ownership and Managerial Ownership on Corporate Financial Performance through Earning Management. Using the Path Analysis method for banks listed on the Stock Exchange, there is evidence that Institutional Ownership and Managerial Ownership influence Corporate Financial Performance through the mediation of earnings management. Both of these variables negatively affect earnings management, and earnings management has a negative influence on the company's financial performance. That is every increase in managerial ownership and institutional ownership increases, causing a decrease in earnings management, while a decrease in earnings management can increase the company's financial performance. This study succeeded in proving in the banking sector that earnings management can be suppressed by a self-control mechanism to reduce the effect of agency theory, among others by (1) ownership of company shares by the manager (managerial ownership); (2) share ownership by institutions (institutional ownership). This study also proves that the firm size and audit committee control variables have no significant effect on the company's financial performance.
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机构所有权和管理层所有权对公司财务绩效的影响:中介盈余管理。
本研究旨在透过盈余管理,取得机构持股与经理人持股对公司财务绩效影响的实证证据。运用路径分析方法对上市银行进行实证分析,发现机构持股和管理层持股通过盈余管理的中介作用影响公司财务绩效。这两个变量都对盈余管理产生负向影响,盈余管理对公司的财务绩效产生负向影响。也就是说,每增加管理层持股和机构持股,导致盈余管理的减少,而减少盈余管理可以提高公司的财务业绩。本研究成功地证明了银行部门的盈余管理可以通过自我控制机制来抑制,以降低代理理论的影响,其中包括:(1)经理持有公司股份(管理层持股);(2)事业单位参股(事业单位参股)。本研究还证明了公司规模和审计委员会控制变量对公司财务绩效的影响不显著。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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