An Analysis of Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Indicators on Discretionary Accruals

M. Asif, Ehtisham Ul Haq, M. Waseem
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Abstract

The debate on the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on earnings management remains uncertain. This study explored the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on earnings management with the use of the ordinary least square estimation method in the context of Pakistan. This study utilized the famous modified John’s model (1995) for estimating discretional accruals which are used as a proxy for earning management. Our results indicated that institutional investors play a significant role in constraining earnings management practices. The number of members on the board of directors, and ownership concentration influence discretionary accruals. Among the control variables, we found that more profitable firms, are growing, or have higher leverage actively manage their earnings, while earnings management decreases with the age of the firm. Results from this study revealed around the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance code on earnings management was diverse. Larger investment by institutions decreases ownership concentration, removes block holding and consequently, it would decrease earning management. The result revealed that board independence has a positive impact on earning management. These results suggested that the board did not act as a monitoring tool to reduce the manipulation of the accounting information.
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股权结构与公司治理指标对可操纵性应计利润的影响分析
关于股权结构和公司治理对盈余管理影响的争论仍然不确定。本研究以巴基斯坦为背景,运用普通最小二乘估计方法,探讨股权结构和公司治理对盈余管理的影响。本研究利用著名的修正John’s模型(1995)来估计可自由支配的应计收益,该模型被用作盈余管理的代理。我们的研究结果表明,机构投资者在约束盈余管理实践方面发挥了重要作用。董事会成员人数和股权集中度影响可自由支配应计收益。在控制变量中,我们发现更多的盈利公司、成长型公司或杠杆率较高的公司积极管理其盈余,而盈余管理随着公司年龄的增长而减少。研究结果表明,股权结构与公司治理代码对盈余管理的影响存在差异。机构投资的增加降低了股权集中度,消除了大宗持股,从而降低了盈余管理。结果表明,董事会独立性对盈余管理具有正向影响。这些结果表明,董事会没有作为一个监督工具,以减少会计信息的操纵。
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