Why Greater Choice Matters for Developing Countries

Jonas B. Bunte
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Abstract

This chapter reviews the findings from the qualitative and quantitative analyses and discusses key implications. The results provide insights into the competition between traditional and emerging creditors. It is unlikely that BRIC lenders will change their loan conditions match to those of Western creditors. Similarly, multilateral creditors are unlikely to abandon economic conditions as part of their loan offers just to make their loans more attractive. As a result, the theory predicts that the clientele of lenders will become more polarized across creditors and more homogenous for each individual creditor. At the same time, the findings suggest that the emergence of new creditors has increased the room to maneuver for developing countries. With respect to economic development, this means greater autonomy to choose between a neoliberal approach and a state-led industrialization model akin to that of the East Asian Tigers. With respect to democracy, the findings could imply that Chinese loans might actually promote democracy.
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为什么更多的选择对发展中国家很重要
本章回顾了定性和定量分析的结果,并讨论了关键含义。研究结果为传统债权人与新兴债权人之间的竞争提供了洞见。金砖四国的贷款人不太可能改变他们的贷款条件以适应西方债权人。同样,多边债权人不太可能仅仅为了让贷款更具吸引力而放弃经济条件作为贷款条件的一部分。因此,该理论预测,贷款人的客户将在债权人之间变得更加两极化,对每个债权人来说也更加同质化。与此同时,调查结果表明,新的债权国的出现增加了发展中国家的回旋余地。就经济发展而言,这意味着更大的自主权,可以在新自由主义方法和类似于东亚四小龙的国家主导的工业化模式之间做出选择。就民主而言,研究结果可能暗示中国的贷款实际上可能促进民主。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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