The DISCLOSE Act, Deliberation, and the First Amendment

J. Samples
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Abstract

The United States Supreme Court decided in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that Congress may not prohibit spending on political speech by corporations. President Obama and several members of Congress have sharply criticized Citizens United, and Sen. Charles Schumer and Rep. Chris Van Hollen have proposed the DISCLOSE Act in response to the ruling. DISCLOSE mandates disclosure of corporate sources of independent spending on speech, putatively in the interest of shareholders and voters. However, it is unlikely that either shareholders or voters would be made better off by this legislation. Shareholders could demand and receive such disclosure without government mandates, given the efficiency of capital markets. The benefits of such disclosure for voters are likely less than assumed, while the costs are paid in chilled speech and in less rational public deliberation. DISCLOSE also prohibits speech by government contractors, TARP recipients, and companies managed by foreign nationals. The case for prohibiting speech by each of these groups seems flawed. In general, DISCLOSE exploits loopholes in Citizens United limits on government control of speech to contravene the spirit of that decision and the letter of the First Amendment.
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披露法案,审议和第一修正案
美国最高法院在“联合公民诉联邦选举委员会”一案中裁定,国会不得禁止企业在政治演讲上的支出。奥巴马总统和几位国会议员严厉批评了公民联合,参议员查尔斯·舒默和众议员克里斯·范·霍伦提出了《披露法案》,以回应这一裁决。《披露》要求披露公司独立言论支出的来源,假定这是为了股东和选民的利益。然而,无论是股东还是选民都不太可能从这项立法中获益。考虑到资本市场的效率,股东可以在没有政府授权的情况下要求并接受此类披露。这种信息披露给选民带来的好处可能比想象的要少,而付出的代价则是冷淡的言论和不那么理性的公众审议。《披露》还禁止政府承包商、问题资产救助计划接受者和由外国人管理的公司发表言论。禁止这些团体发表言论的理由似乎是有缺陷的。总的来说,“披露”案利用了“公民联合”限制政府控制言论的漏洞,违反了该判决的精神和第一修正案的文字。
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