Nils Ole Tippenhauer, W. G. Temple, A. Vu, Binbin Chen, D. Nicol, Z. Kalbarczyk, W. Sanders
{"title":"Automatic Generation of Security Argument Graphs","authors":"Nils Ole Tippenhauer, W. G. Temple, A. Vu, Binbin Chen, D. Nicol, Z. Kalbarczyk, W. Sanders","doi":"10.1109/PRDC.2014.13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Graph-based assessment formalisms have proven to be useful in the safety, dependability, and security communities to help stakeholders manage risk and maintain appropriate documentation throughout the system lifecycle. In this paper, we propose a set of methods to automatically construct security argument graphs, a graphical formalism that integrates various security-related information to argue about the security level of a system. Our approach is to generate the graph in a progressive manner by exploiting logical relationships among pieces of diverse input information. Using those emergent argument patterns as a starting point, we define a set of extension templates that can be applied iteratively to grow a security argument graph. Using a scenario from the electric power sector, we demonstrate the graph generation process and highlight its application for system security evaluation in our prototype software tool, Cyber SAGE.","PeriodicalId":187000,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE 20th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 IEEE 20th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2014.13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Abstract
Graph-based assessment formalisms have proven to be useful in the safety, dependability, and security communities to help stakeholders manage risk and maintain appropriate documentation throughout the system lifecycle. In this paper, we propose a set of methods to automatically construct security argument graphs, a graphical formalism that integrates various security-related information to argue about the security level of a system. Our approach is to generate the graph in a progressive manner by exploiting logical relationships among pieces of diverse input information. Using those emergent argument patterns as a starting point, we define a set of extension templates that can be applied iteratively to grow a security argument graph. Using a scenario from the electric power sector, we demonstrate the graph generation process and highlight its application for system security evaluation in our prototype software tool, Cyber SAGE.