Offsetting Performance Losses Due to Cheating in Unproctored Internet‐Based Testing by Increasing the Applicant Pool

R. Landers, P. Sackett
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

A concern about unproctored Internet‐based testing (UIT) without follow‐up verification is that because applicants are able to cheat when completing tests, test validity decreases to an unknown extent. However, this view ignores a potential advantage to UIT: Should UIT increase applicant pool size, an organization with a fixed goal in terms of the number of candidates to advance to the next stage of the hiring process can increase the cutoff score and thus be more selective. In this study, a simulation was conducted to determine if this advantage outweighs the cheating disadvantage in the prediction of job performance. When the applicant pool is increased substantially through UIT, job performance outcomes are often higher even when many applicants increase their test scores through cheating.
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通过增加申请人池来抵消在无监考的互联网测试中作弊造成的性能损失
对于没有后续验证的无监督网络测试(UIT)的担忧是,由于申请人能够在完成测试时作弊,测试的有效性会下降到未知的程度。然而,这种观点忽略了UIT的一个潜在优势:如果UIT增加了申请人的数量,那么一个在进入下一阶段招聘过程的候选人数量方面有固定目标的组织可以提高分数线,从而更有选择性。在这项研究中,进行了模拟,以确定在预测工作绩效时,这种优势是否大于作弊的劣势。当申请人数量通过UIT大幅增加时,即使许多申请人通过作弊提高考试成绩,工作表现结果也往往更高。
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