Investment Timing and Capacity Decisions with Time-to-Build in a Duopoly Market

Abstract

Abstract In this study, we investigate optimal investment timing and capacity decisions in the presence of time-to-build and competition. Due to uncertain time-to-build, a leader, who invests first, may have its product enter the market after a follower’s. We show that a dominated firm with the longer time-to-build can become a leader by making the investment earlier than a dominant firm with shorter investment lags. The leader’s capacity choice increases with the dominated firm’s time-to-build, even if the dominated entity is the leader. This finding is consistent with the observation in the electric vehicles market in which a relatively new firm with little experience of mass production makes aggressive investment early on, while the biggest carmakers capable of mass production are timing their investment. With a welfare-maximizing policy, however, the dominant firm with the shorter time-to-build always becomes the leader. There is a significant loss of social welfare with the dominated firm being the leader, and the loss increases with the asymmetry of time-to-build.