{"title":"Antitrust Error Costs","authors":"Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853282","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The idea that consideration of error costs should inform judgments about actions with uncertain consequences is well established. When we act on imperfect information, we consider not only the probability of an event, but also the expected costs of making an error. In 1984 Frank Easterbrook used this idea to rationalize an anti-enforcement bias in antitrust, reasoning that markets are likely to correct monopoly in a relatively short time while judicial errors are likely to persist. As a result, false positives (recognizing a problem when there is none) are more costly than false negatives. While the problem of error cost bias is not explicitly mentioned all that frequently in antitrust cases, its influence is broad and deep, guiding the formation of presumptions and burdens of proof. The anti-enforcement bias in antitrust originated long before Easterbrook wrote, and was reflected in the work of George J. Stigler and Milton Friedman, mainly in the 1940s and 1950s. They had attempted to dismantle theories of imperfect competition in favor of models in which competition nearly always prevailed unless restrained by government action. While the ideas underlying the error cost framework were relatively new ones in law schools, by the 1980s they were already in decline in industrial organization economics. Easterbrook was writing defensively. An empirical revolution in economics was already well engaged in a process that found imperfect competition models to be more testable, more dominant, and more useful for policy judgments. In the process, classical Marshall/Stigler models of perfect competition were all but abandoned as irrelevant. This empirical work provides increasing evidence that United States antitrust policy, but particularly merger policy, took a significant wrong turn in the mid-eighties. Today the error cost framework exists mainly as a result of rent seeking by firms who stand to profit from the low output and high margin consequences of this antitrust anti-enforcement bias.","PeriodicalId":166493,"journal":{"name":"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853282","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
The idea that consideration of error costs should inform judgments about actions with uncertain consequences is well established. When we act on imperfect information, we consider not only the probability of an event, but also the expected costs of making an error. In 1984 Frank Easterbrook used this idea to rationalize an anti-enforcement bias in antitrust, reasoning that markets are likely to correct monopoly in a relatively short time while judicial errors are likely to persist. As a result, false positives (recognizing a problem when there is none) are more costly than false negatives. While the problem of error cost bias is not explicitly mentioned all that frequently in antitrust cases, its influence is broad and deep, guiding the formation of presumptions and burdens of proof. The anti-enforcement bias in antitrust originated long before Easterbrook wrote, and was reflected in the work of George J. Stigler and Milton Friedman, mainly in the 1940s and 1950s. They had attempted to dismantle theories of imperfect competition in favor of models in which competition nearly always prevailed unless restrained by government action. While the ideas underlying the error cost framework were relatively new ones in law schools, by the 1980s they were already in decline in industrial organization economics. Easterbrook was writing defensively. An empirical revolution in economics was already well engaged in a process that found imperfect competition models to be more testable, more dominant, and more useful for policy judgments. In the process, classical Marshall/Stigler models of perfect competition were all but abandoned as irrelevant. This empirical work provides increasing evidence that United States antitrust policy, but particularly merger policy, took a significant wrong turn in the mid-eighties. Today the error cost framework exists mainly as a result of rent seeking by firms who stand to profit from the low output and high margin consequences of this antitrust anti-enforcement bias.
对错误成本的考虑应该为判断具有不确定后果的行为提供依据,这一观点已得到广泛认可。当我们根据不完全信息采取行动时,我们不仅要考虑事件发生的概率,还要考虑犯错误的预期代价。1984年,弗兰克·伊斯特布鲁克(Frank Easterbrook)用这一观点来合理化反垄断中的反执法偏见,理由是市场可能在相对较短的时间内纠正垄断,而司法错误可能持续存在。因此,假阳性(在没有问题的情况下识别出问题)比假阴性代价更高。虽然错误成本偏差问题在反垄断案件中并没有经常被明确提及,但它的影响是广泛而深刻的,指导着推定和举证责任的形成。反垄断中的反执法偏见早在伊斯特布鲁克写作之前就存在了,并在乔治·j·斯蒂格勒(George J. Stigler)和米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)的著作中得到了反映,主要是在20世纪40年代和50年代。他们试图推翻不完全竞争理论,支持除非受到政府行为限制,否则竞争几乎总是占上风的模式。虽然错误成本框架的基础思想在法学院中相对较新,但到20世纪80年代,它们在产业组织经济学中已经衰落。伊斯特布鲁克是在防守。经济学中的经验革命已经很好地参与了一个过程,发现不完全竞争模型更可测试,更占主导地位,对政策判断更有用。在这个过程中,经典的马歇尔/斯蒂格勒完全竞争模型几乎被视为无关紧要而抛弃。这项实证工作提供了越来越多的证据,表明美国的反垄断政策,尤其是合并政策,在80年代中期出现了重大的错误转向。今天,错误成本框架的存在主要是由于企业寻求租金的结果,这些企业从这种反垄断反执法偏见的低产量和高利润后果中获利。