TAIWAN CRISIS ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF «BARGAINING OF WAR THEORY»

Abstract

The article analyzes the consequences for China of the forceful reunification of Taiwan and to assess the acceptability of these consequences for Beijing authorities. The choice to conquer or not to conquer Taiwan is discussed from the perspective of the Bargaining Model of War that based on an assessment of the benefits costs ratio. The evaluation of the decision cost definitely depends on the perception of the rival’s actions and other external and internal variables. Each side evaluates more optimistic its own benefit-cost ratio and tries to shift the other side coast of war perception in order to change the decision to fight. The author comes to the conclusion that, on the one hand, the benefits-costs ratio is not favorable for Chinese authorities and they are not going to occupy Taiwan in current moment. But, on the other hand, China uses the threat to Taiwan as a lever in bargaining or deterring the United States. Also, the threat is used by Beijing for a pessimistic impact to the benefits-costs assessment in the event of Taiwan’s refusal to reunite and follow «Consensus 1992».