How Divisive Primaries Hurt Parties: Evidence from Near-Runoffs

Alexander Fouirnaies, Andrew B. Hall
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Abstract

In many democracies, parties and their voters rely on competitive primary elections to choose nominees for the general election. Competitive primaries may help parties select higher quality candidates and advertise these candidates to voters, but they also run the risk of exposing nominees' flaws, offending losing candidates' supporters, and making the party look weak to general-election voters. Do longer, more competitive primaries help or harm parties in the general election? The existing literature on so-called divisive primaries comes to mixed conclusions, likely because of chronic issues of omitted variable bias and reverse causation. In this paper, we address these problems by taking advantage of U.S. states that use runoff primaries, second-round elections which, when triggered, create longer, more contentious primaries. Using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections close to the runoff threshold, we find large and negative effects of runoffs on the party's general-election fortune in the U.S. House and Senate. We estimate that going to a runoff decreases the party's general election vote share by 6-9 percentage points, on average, and decreases the probability that the party wins the general election by roughly 21 percentage points, on average. In U.S. state legislatures, in contrast, runoff primaries do not hurt, and in competitive contexts may in fact help, parties in the general election. The results suggest that divisive primary elections are highly damaging when salience is high but beneficial when salience is low, a pattern we argue is driven by the opposing effects of information in high vs. low salience primary elections.
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分裂的初选如何伤害政党:来自接近决选的证据
在许多民主国家,政党及其选民依靠竞争性的初选来选出大选候选人。竞争激烈的初选可能有助于各政党挑选出更高质量的候选人,并向选民宣传这些候选人,但它们也有可能暴露被提名者的缺陷,得罪落选候选人的支持者,并使该党在大选选民面前显得软弱。时间更长、竞争更激烈的初选对大选中的政党是有利还是有害?关于所谓的分裂初选的现有文献得出了不同的结论,可能是因为忽略变量偏差和反向因果关系的长期问题。在本文中,我们通过利用使用决选初选的美国各州来解决这些问题,第二轮选举一旦触发,就会产生更长时间、更具争议性的初选。在接近决选门槛的初选中使用回归不连续设计,我们发现决选对政党在美国众议院和参议院的大选命运产生了巨大的负面影响。我们估计,进行决选会使该党在大选中的得票率平均降低6-9个百分点,并使该党赢得大选的概率平均降低约21个百分点。相比之下,在美国的州立法机构中,决选不会损害政党在大选中的地位,在竞争激烈的环境中,决选实际上可能会对政党有利。结果表明,当显著性高时,分裂性初选具有高度破坏性,而当显著性低时,则是有益的,我们认为这种模式是由高显著性和低显著性初选中信息的相反影响驱动的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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