This study aims to determine success factors on equity-based crowdfunding project fundraising in several countries in Asia. We evaluated three categories of factors: campaign characteristics, human capital factors, and social capital factors. We evaluate models using 201 project samples on various platforms from Indonesia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Israel, and South Korea from January 2018 until December 2019. We used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as the method of hypothesis testing. We found that the most critical variable in the campaign characteristics is the financial information provided. Meanwhile, unless the number of team members, each human capital factor is significantly positive to campaign success. Lastly, both social networks and business advisor's presence have a significant positive relationship to crowdfunding project fundraising success. However, we do not found a significantly different pattern between high-income and lower-income countries evaluated.
{"title":"What Information Needed to Present in a Fundraising Campaign through Equity Crowdfunding","authors":"Chika Fajarini, Z. Dalimunthe, Shalahuddin Haikal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3923526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3923526","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to determine success factors on equity-based crowdfunding project fundraising in several countries in Asia. We evaluated three categories of factors: campaign characteristics, human capital factors, and social capital factors. We evaluate models using 201 project samples on various platforms from Indonesia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Israel, and South Korea from January 2018 until December 2019. We used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as the method of hypothesis testing. We found that the most critical variable in the campaign characteristics is the financial information provided. Meanwhile, unless the number of team members, each human capital factor is significantly positive to campaign success. Lastly, both social networks and business advisor's presence have a significant positive relationship to crowdfunding project fundraising success. However, we do not found a significantly different pattern between high-income and lower-income countries evaluated.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131216033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The US 2020 presidential election constitutes an anomaly for the general paradigm of learning from history that organizes cross-national research in politics. Was it a unique event that can be ignored or must we consider that history is no longer a reliable guide?
{"title":"The US 2020 Election and Learning from History","authors":"A. Przeworski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3892023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3892023","url":null,"abstract":"The US 2020 presidential election constitutes an anomaly for the general paradigm of learning from history that organizes cross-national research in politics. Was it a unique event that can be ignored or must we consider that history is no longer a reliable guide?","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116666305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign spending when detrimental information affects the incumbent's reputation. Conversely, beneficial information decreases candidates' spending. The main channel is that information affects the expected competitiveness of elections and, therefore, candidates' spending. Only information disclosed before electoral campaigns impacts campaign spending. Furthermore, incumbents also adapt a conditional cash transfers program by increasing (decreasing) the beneficiaries when detrimental (beneficial) reputation shocks occur.
{"title":"Reputation shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns","authors":"Rubén Poblete-Cazenave","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3786253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3786253","url":null,"abstract":"Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign spending when detrimental information affects the incumbent's reputation. Conversely, beneficial information decreases candidates' spending. The main channel is that information affects the expected competitiveness of elections and, therefore, candidates' spending. Only information disclosed before electoral campaigns impacts campaign spending. Furthermore, incumbents also adapt a conditional cash transfers program by increasing (decreasing) the beneficiaries when detrimental (beneficial) reputation shocks occur. <br>","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115403048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dominik Hangartner, Nelson A. Ruiz, Janne Tukiainen
What effect does using open (as opposed to closed) lists in proportional representation elections have on party performance and the quality of candidate selection? We provide novel evidence by studying local elections in Colombia, where parties have discretion to field either open or closed lists. Using panel data covering the 1,100 Colombian municipalities for the 2003–2015 period, we leverage within-party, within-municipality, and over-time variation to identify the effect of ballot structure. We find that the adoption of open list dramatically increases parties’ vote and seat shares. Semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of candidates reveal that parties that use closed list struggle to attract high-quality candidates and to incentivize them to campaign. Consistent with these mechanisms, our statistical analyses confirm that open-list candidates are more experienced, more engaged in their constituencies and campaigns, and less likely to have committed election fraud in the past.
{"title":"Open or Closed? How List Type Affects Electoral Performance, Candidate Selection, and Campaign Effort","authors":"Dominik Hangartner, Nelson A. Ruiz, Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3418767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3418767","url":null,"abstract":"What effect does using open (as opposed to closed) lists in proportional representation elections have on party performance and the quality of candidate selection? We provide novel evidence by studying local elections in Colombia, where parties have discretion to field either open or closed lists. Using panel data covering the 1,100 Colombian municipalities for the 2003–2015 period, we leverage within-party, within-municipality, and over-time variation to identify the effect of ballot structure. We find that the adoption of open list dramatically increases parties’ vote and seat shares. Semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of candidates reveal that parties that use closed list struggle to attract high-quality candidates and to incentivize them to campaign. Consistent with these mechanisms, our statistical analyses confirm that open-list candidates are more experienced, more engaged in their constituencies and campaigns, and less likely to have committed election fraud in the past.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132165623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive three times more money from employees than the candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with the political preferences of their CEOs are more likely to leave their employer.
{"title":"Do CEOs Affect Employees' Political Choices","authors":"I. Babenko, Viktar Fedaseyeu, Song Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2954449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2954449","url":null,"abstract":"We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive three times more money from employees than the candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with the political preferences of their CEOs are more likely to leave their employer.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115221582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines insurgent as “one who acts contrary to the policies and decisions of one’s own political party.” In this paper, an “insurgent presidential campaign” is defined as the campaign of a candidate who did not have the support of the United States of America’s (U.S.) Democratic Party establishment. A “populist campaign” is a subset of an insurgent campaign, because although all populist campaigns are insurgent campaigns, not all insurgent campaigns are populist campaigns. This paper defines a “populist campaign” as one that seeks to mobilize an unrepresented segment of the population against an institution or government, usually in defense of the unrepresented. Whether left-wing or right-wing, populist candidates seek to unite the supposedly uncorrupt and unsophisticated unrepresented against supposedly corrupt dominant elites. Insurgent campaigns have rarely been successful in capturing the Democratic Party presidential nomination in the United States. Only three insurgent campaigns have been successful over the past 50 years: the campaigns of George McGovern in 1972, Jimmy Carter in 1976, and Barack Obama in 2008, all of which were populist campaigns. The paper analyzes U.S. presidential campaigns for the period 1968-2016; reviews books and academic literature; and makes conclusions concerning the success and failure of insurgent campaigns. Finally, the paper recommends ways in which future insurgent campaigns could be more successful.
{"title":"Why Insurgent Campaigns Rarely Win the Democratic Presidential Primary in the United States","authors":"L. J. Reid","doi":"10.30958/AJSS.6-2-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30958/AJSS.6-2-4","url":null,"abstract":"The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines insurgent as “one who acts contrary to the policies and decisions of one’s own political party.” In this paper, an “insurgent presidential campaign” is defined as the campaign of a candidate who did not have the support of the United States of America’s (U.S.) Democratic Party establishment. \u0000 \u0000A “populist campaign” is a subset of an insurgent campaign, because although all populist campaigns are insurgent campaigns, not all insurgent campaigns are populist campaigns. \u0000 \u0000This paper defines a “populist campaign” as one that seeks to mobilize an unrepresented segment of the population against an institution or government, usually in defense of the unrepresented. Whether left-wing or right-wing, populist candidates seek to unite the supposedly uncorrupt and unsophisticated unrepresented against supposedly corrupt dominant elites. \u0000 \u0000Insurgent campaigns have rarely been successful in capturing the Democratic Party presidential nomination in the United States. Only three insurgent campaigns have been successful over the past 50 years: the campaigns of George McGovern in 1972, Jimmy Carter in 1976, and Barack Obama in 2008, all of which were populist campaigns. \u0000 \u0000The paper analyzes U.S. presidential campaigns for the period 1968-2016; reviews books and academic literature; and makes conclusions concerning the success and failure of insurgent campaigns. \u0000 \u0000Finally, the paper recommends ways in which future insurgent campaigns could be more successful.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114115034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Propaganda, a social media tool of political reform In Nigerian elections.
在尼日利亚选举中，宣传是政治改革的社交媒体工具。
{"title":"Propaganda or Persuasion? A Review of the Nigeria 2015 Presidential Election Campaign Process via Social Media (Part Two)","authors":"O. Onafuwa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3089825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3089825","url":null,"abstract":"Propaganda, a social media tool of political reform In Nigerian elections.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122360454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the last generation, congressional moderates have become ideologically more extreme over the course of their careers. We explain this "ideological migration" of moderates as a side effect of close partisan competition for control of the US House since 1994. Competition for the House caused activists, donors and, indirectly, voters to focus on the battle for majority status. Increased attention to partisan competition reduced individual members' ability to escape blame for their parties' actions. Equivalently, it meant that members could deviate from their district preferences and pay a lower electoral penalty; they would be blamed in any event. Our empirical analysis shows that party-centeredness abruptly and dramatically increased after 1994, with the electoral penalty members paid for being out of step with their constituents correspondingly declining. This contributed to an important, albeit complicated, shift from local/personal to national/party representation.
{"title":"Ideological Extremists in the U.S. Congress: Out of Step but Still in Office","authors":"Adam Bonica, G. Cox","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2970341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2970341","url":null,"abstract":"In the last generation, congressional moderates have become ideologically more extreme over the course of their careers. We explain this \"ideological migration\" of moderates as a side effect of close partisan competition for control of the US House since 1994. Competition for the House caused activists, donors and, indirectly, voters to focus on the battle for majority status. Increased attention to partisan competition reduced individual members' ability to escape blame for their parties' actions. Equivalently, it meant that members could deviate from their district preferences and pay a lower electoral penalty; they would be blamed in any event. Our empirical analysis shows that party-centeredness abruptly and dramatically increased after 1994, with the electoral penalty members paid for being out of step with their constituents correspondingly declining. This contributed to an important, albeit complicated, shift from local/personal to national/party representation.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127857829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many democracies, parties and their voters rely on competitive primary elections to choose nominees for the general election. Competitive primaries may help parties select higher quality candidates and advertise these candidates to voters, but they also run the risk of exposing nominees' flaws, offending losing candidates' supporters, and making the party look weak to general-election voters. Do longer, more competitive primaries help or harm parties in the general election? The existing literature on so-called divisive primaries comes to mixed conclusions, likely because of chronic issues of omitted variable bias and reverse causation. In this paper, we address these problems by taking advantage of U.S. states that use runoff primaries, second-round elections which, when triggered, create longer, more contentious primaries. Using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections close to the runoff threshold, we find large and negative effects of runoffs on the party's general-election fortune in the U.S. House and Senate. We estimate that going to a runoff decreases the party's general election vote share by 6-9 percentage points, on average, and decreases the probability that the party wins the general election by roughly 21 percentage points, on average. In U.S. state legislatures, in contrast, runoff primaries do not hurt, and in competitive contexts may in fact help, parties in the general election. The results suggest that divisive primary elections are highly damaging when salience is high but beneficial when salience is low, a pattern we argue is driven by the opposing effects of information in high vs. low salience primary elections.
{"title":"How Divisive Primaries Hurt Parties: Evidence from Near-Runoffs","authors":"Alexander Fouirnaies, Andrew B. Hall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2775324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2775324","url":null,"abstract":"In many democracies, parties and their voters rely on competitive primary elections to choose nominees for the general election. Competitive primaries may help parties select higher quality candidates and advertise these candidates to voters, but they also run the risk of exposing nominees' flaws, offending losing candidates' supporters, and making the party look weak to general-election voters. Do longer, more competitive primaries help or harm parties in the general election? The existing literature on so-called divisive primaries comes to mixed conclusions, likely because of chronic issues of omitted variable bias and reverse causation. In this paper, we address these problems by taking advantage of U.S. states that use runoff primaries, second-round elections which, when triggered, create longer, more contentious primaries. Using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections close to the runoff threshold, we find large and negative effects of runoffs on the party's general-election fortune in the U.S. House and Senate. We estimate that going to a runoff decreases the party's general election vote share by 6-9 percentage points, on average, and decreases the probability that the party wins the general election by roughly 21 percentage points, on average. In U.S. state legislatures, in contrast, runoff primaries do not hurt, and in competitive contexts may in fact help, parties in the general election. The results suggest that divisive primary elections are highly damaging when salience is high but beneficial when salience is low, a pattern we argue is driven by the opposing effects of information in high vs. low salience primary elections.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133344610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political marketing currently an evolved niche has been researched for more than 2 decades (Harrop 1990, Gronroos 1990,, Henneberg 1998, Kotler 1999, O’Shaughnessy 2001, Marshment 2001,) The article has been conceptualized in the context of the recently concluded Indian general elections Loksabha 2014 (LS2014). Careful assessment of the political market environment was undertaken along with the competing political products or brands and their respective political value propositions. The article further tries to outline industry approach to political engagement, politics as a marketable entity (Aron O’Cass 2001), competitive strategy in the political market place, redefinition of product category, and IMC issue. Data from secondary and primary sources were recontexualised (Heaton) to present an industry like scenario of Indian political industry circa2014. Effort was made to study existing need gaps in political market and how the new political product Aam Admi Party attempted to address these gaps through its product launch. While doing so the study draws analogy with the attributes of consumer market place perhaps signaling professionalism of marketing in non-profit welfare organizations for example state itself, parties running state or state enterprises.
政治营销目前是一个进化的利基已经研究了20多年(Harrop 1990, Gronroos 1990, Henneberg 1998, Kotler 1999, O 'Shaughnessy 2001, Marshment 2001)，文章在最近结束的印度大选Loksabha 2014 (LS2014)的背景下进行了概念化。对政治市场环境以及相互竞争的政治产品或品牌及其各自的政治价值主张进行了仔细的评估。本文进一步试图概述政治参与的行业方法，作为可销售实体的政治(Aron O 'Cass 2001)，政治市场中的竞争战略，产品类别的重新定义，以及IMC问题。来自二手和一手来源的数据被重新整理(Heaton)，以呈现2014年前后印度政治行业的行业场景。努力研究政治市场存在的需求缺口，以及新的政治产品Aam Admi党如何试图通过其产品发布来解决这些缺口。在这样做的同时，该研究与消费者市场的属性进行了类比，也许表明了非营利福利组织(例如国家本身)营销的专业性，运行国家或国有企业的政党。
{"title":"Political Marketing in India 2014: Case of New Political Product AAP","authors":"K. Gupta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2917075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917075","url":null,"abstract":"Political marketing currently an evolved niche has been researched for more than 2 decades (Harrop 1990, Gronroos 1990,, Henneberg 1998, Kotler 1999, O’Shaughnessy 2001, Marshment 2001,) The article has been conceptualized in the context of the recently concluded Indian general elections Loksabha 2014 (LS2014). Careful assessment of the political market environment was undertaken along with the competing political products or brands and their respective political value propositions. The article further tries to outline industry approach to political engagement, politics as a marketable entity (Aron O’Cass 2001), competitive strategy in the political market place, redefinition of product category, and IMC issue. Data from secondary and primary sources were recontexualised (Heaton) to present an industry like scenario of Indian political industry circa2014. Effort was made to study existing need gaps in political market and how the new political product Aam Admi Party attempted to address these gaps through its product launch. While doing so the study draws analogy with the attributes of consumer market place perhaps signaling professionalism of marketing in non-profit welfare organizations for example state itself, parties running state or state enterprises.","PeriodicalId":371785,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaigns (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134403895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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