HCODE: Hardware-Enhanced Real-Time CFI

J. Danger, S. Guilley, Thibault Porteboeuf, Florian Praden, Michaël Timbert
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

Cyber-attacks are widely known to be a major threat on computing devices. Many attacks exploit a latent problem in the host program. This can be a misconfiguration or a real programming error (e.g., lack of user-provided input verification or untested corner cases). Once such a bug is identified, attack programs can be devised, which will for instance install a payload on the victim host. Many features have been developed to protect from these infection vectors. In this paper we present a simple hardware/software solution able to check good execution of one program by checking that each basic block is correctly executed and that the Control Flow Graph (CFG) is respected. We call this control-flow integrity (CFI). We are able to do so in real time without adding new opcodes in the processor, but by modifying slightly the executed code. Moreover, we also aim at verifying that the sequence of instructions is correctly executed within each basic block. In this respect, we implement a hardware module called HCODE, (short for Hashing CODE), into the processor which reads each instruction executed by the processor and computes some signature to check against a genuine copy of precomputed signatures.
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HCODE:硬件增强实时CFI
众所周知,网络攻击是对计算设备的主要威胁。许多攻击利用了宿主程序中的潜在问题。这可能是配置错误或真正的编程错误(例如,缺乏用户提供的输入验证或未测试的角落用例)。一旦识别出这样的漏洞,就可以设计攻击程序,例如在受害主机上安装有效载荷。已经开发了许多功能来保护免受这些感染媒介的侵害。在本文中,我们提出了一个简单的硬件/软件解决方案,能够通过检查每个基本块是否正确执行以及控制流图(CFG)是否得到尊重来检查一个程序的良好执行。我们称之为控制流完整性(CFI)。我们无需在处理器中添加新的操作码,只需稍微修改已执行的代码即可实时地完成此操作。此外,我们还旨在验证指令序列在每个基本块中是否正确执行。在这方面,我们在处理器中实现了一个名为HCODE(哈希代码的缩写)的硬件模块,它读取处理器执行的每条指令,并计算一些签名来检查预计算签名的真实副本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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