{"title":"Stability and Immunity to Capacity Manipulation in Large Matching Markets","authors":"Morteza Honarvar, Behrang Kamali-Shahdadi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3738973","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Stable mechanisms are not strategy-proof in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences, and there is a continuum of students. We find an upper bound for the colleges’ capacities vector such that colleges have the incentive to report their capacities truthfully in any stable mechanism.","PeriodicalId":409545,"journal":{"name":"EduRN: Economics Education (ERN) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"EduRN: Economics Education (ERN) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3738973","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract Stable mechanisms are not strategy-proof in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences, and there is a continuum of students. We find an upper bound for the colleges’ capacities vector such that colleges have the incentive to report their capacities truthfully in any stable mechanism.
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