Reputation is golden: Superstar CEOs and trade credit

IF 2.2 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2023-06-15 DOI:10.1111/jbfa.12735
Xiaofeng Quan, Cheng Xiang, Ru (Tina) Gao
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Abstract

This study investigates how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reputation, proxied by receiving prestigious awards, impacts suppliers’ provision of trade credit to a firm. Employing a sample of Chinese public firms, we document that firms managed by award-winning CEOs receive more trade credit than do propensity score matching matched control firms after the award year. Further analyses suggest that the increased trade credit of firms with reputable CEOs is due to the decreased default risk and information risk associated with those firms. Moreover, the impact of CEOs’ reputations on trade credit varies depending on award rarity, financing needs, CEO characteristics and firm opacity. Overall, our results are consistent with efficient contracting theory and signal theory.

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信誉是金:超级明星首席执行官与贸易信用
本研究探讨了首席执行官(CEO)的声誉(以获得著名奖项为代表)如何影响供应商向企业提供贸易信贷。我们以中国上市公司为样本,记录了获奖首席执行官管理的公司在获奖年度后获得的贸易信贷多于倾向得分匹配的对照公司。进一步的分析表明,由声誉卓著的首席执行官管理的公司获得更多贸易信贷的原因是这些公司的违约风险和信息风险降低了。此外,首席执行官的声誉对贸易信贷的影响因奖项的稀缺性、融资需求、首席执行官的特征和公司的不透明性而异。总体而言,我们的研究结果符合有效契约理论和信号理论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
17.20%
发文量
70
期刊介绍: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control structures. A feature of JBFA is that it recognises that informational problems are pervasive in financial markets and business organisations, and that accounting plays an important role in resolving such problems. JBFA welcomes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, theoretical papers should yield novel testable implications, and empirical papers should be theoretically well-motivated. The Editors view accounting and finance as being closely related to economics and, as a consequence, papers submitted will often have theoretical motivations that are grounded in economics. JBFA, however, also seeks papers that complement economics-based theorising with theoretical developments originating in other social science disciplines or traditions. While many papers in JBFA use econometric or related empirical methods, the Editors also welcome contributions that use other empirical research methods. Although the scope of JBFA is broad, it is not a suitable outlet for highly abstract mathematical papers, or empirical papers with inadequate theoretical motivation. Also, papers that study asset pricing, or the operations of financial markets, should have direct implications for one or more of preparers, regulators, users of financial statements, and corporate financial decision makers, or at least should have implications for the development of future research relevant to such users.
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