Mind the Gap: CEO-Employee Pay Ratios and Shareholder Say-on-Pay Votes

Steven Crawford, Karen K. Nelson, Brian R. Rountree
{"title":"Mind the Gap: CEO-Employee Pay Ratios and Shareholder Say-on-Pay Votes","authors":"Steven Crawford, Karen K. Nelson, Brian R. Rountree","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3088052","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether the ratio of CEO to employee pay (the pay ratio) informs shareholder say-on-pay (SOP) votes for a broad panel of U.S. commercial banks. For the vast majority of the sample, pay ratios are substantially lower than the levels criticized in the policy debate and financial press. Nevertheless, voting dissent on SOP proposals is significantly higher for banks in the top pay ratio decile, particularly when there is high institutional ownership. Results are robust to controlling for a number of other determinants of voting dissent, including proxy advisor recommendations and information about executive compensation already disclosed in proxy statements.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"23","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088052","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23

Abstract

We examine whether the ratio of CEO to employee pay (the pay ratio) informs shareholder say-on-pay (SOP) votes for a broad panel of U.S. commercial banks. For the vast majority of the sample, pay ratios are substantially lower than the levels criticized in the policy debate and financial press. Nevertheless, voting dissent on SOP proposals is significantly higher for banks in the top pay ratio decile, particularly when there is high institutional ownership. Results are robust to controlling for a number of other determinants of voting dissent, including proxy advisor recommendations and information about executive compensation already disclosed in proxy statements.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
注意差距:ceo与员工的薪酬比率和股东对薪酬的决定权
我们研究了CEO与员工薪酬的比率(薪酬比率)是否会影响美国商业银行的股东薪酬话语权(SOP)投票。对于绝大多数样本来说,薪酬比率远低于政策辩论和财经媒体所批评的水平。然而,在薪酬比率最高的十分之一的银行中,对SOP提案的投票异议明显更高,特别是在机构持股比例较高的银行中。结果在控制投票异议的其他决定因素方面是稳健的,包括代理顾问的建议和已经在代理声明中披露的高管薪酬信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
What Do Outside CEOs Really Do? Evidence from Plant-Level Data Energy Finance The Pricing of Acquired Intangibles Inclusive Managers How Do Independent Directors View Generalist vs. Specialist CEOs? Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Shock
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1