Using rich plant-level data, we analyze the relative performance of inside and outside CEOs and provide the first empirical evidence on what CEOs actually do to improve performance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that, relative to insiders, outsiders achieve greater productivity improvements in both low- and high-performing firms. Efficiency gains emerge from divesting low-performing, non-core, and low-tech plants. Additionally, outsiders streamline continuing plants by cutting costs, consolidating products, adopting newer technology, and shifting to more capital-intensive production that improves labor productivity. Outsiders’ advantage in rectifying pre-turnover inefficiencies stems from their ability to stimulate change, rather than their broader experiences.
{"title":"What Do Outside CEOs Really Do? Evidence from Plant-Level Data","authors":"John (Jianqiu) Bai, A. Mkrtchyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3663452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663452","url":null,"abstract":"Using rich plant-level data, we analyze the relative performance of inside and outside CEOs and provide the first empirical evidence on what CEOs actually do to improve performance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that, relative to insiders, outsiders achieve greater productivity improvements in both low- and high-performing firms. Efficiency gains emerge from divesting low-performing, non-core, and low-tech plants. Additionally, outsiders streamline continuing plants by cutting costs, consolidating products, adopting newer technology, and shifting to more capital-intensive production that improves labor productivity. Outsiders’ advantage in rectifying pre-turnover inefficiencies stems from their ability to stimulate change, rather than their broader experiences.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127585323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Defined as a single industrial sector, the global production, distribution and consumption of energy is the world’s largest in terms of annual capital investment (US$1.83 trillion in 2019, the last pre-pandemic year with full data available) and the second largest nonfinancial industry in terms of sales revenue ($4.51 trillion). Over 100 million barrels of oil are produced and consumed each day—with 70% being traded across borders--and each of the world’s 7.5 billion citizens consumes an average of 3,181 kilowatt-hours/year, though per-capita energy consumption varies enormously and is much higher in rich rather than in poor countries. Properly analyzing the financial economics of the global energy industry requires focusing on the both the physical aspects of production and distribution--how, where, and with what type of fuel energy is produced and consumed--and the capital investment required to support each energy segment. The global energy “industry” can be broadly categorized into two main segments: provision of fuels for transportation and production and distribution of electricity for residential and industrial consumption. The fuels sector encompasses the production, processing, and distribution of crude oil and its refined products, mostly gasoline, kerosene (which becomes jet fuel), diesel, gas oil and residual fuel oil. The electric power sector includes four related businesses: generation, transmission, distribution, and supply. The ongoing transformation of the global energy industry is being driven by the twin imperatives of meeting rising demand due to population growth and rising wealth and of addressing climate change through greener energy policies and massive capital investments by corporations and governments. The pathway to de-carbonizing electricity production and distribution by 2050 is fairly straightforward technologically, though doing so will require both scientific innovations (particularly regarding scalable battery storage) and sustained multi-trillion dollar annual investments for the next three decades. Decarbonizing transportation is a far more difficult and expensive proposition, and will require fundamental breakthroughs in multiple technologies, coupled with unusually far-sighted policy action. Extant academic research already provides useful guidance for policy makers in many areas, but far more will be required to help shape the future policy agenda.
{"title":"Energy Finance","authors":"W. Megginson, Heber Farnsworth, Bingyan Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3885218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3885218","url":null,"abstract":"Defined as a single industrial sector, the global production, distribution and consumption of energy is the world’s largest in terms of annual capital investment (US$1.83 trillion in 2019, the last pre-pandemic year with full data available) and the second largest nonfinancial industry in terms of sales revenue ($4.51 trillion). Over 100 million barrels of oil are produced and consumed each day—with 70% being traded across borders--and each of the world’s 7.5 billion citizens consumes an average of 3,181 kilowatt-hours/year, though per-capita energy consumption varies enormously and is much higher in rich rather than in poor countries. Properly analyzing the financial economics of the global energy industry requires focusing on the both the physical aspects of production and distribution--how, where, and with what type of fuel energy is produced and consumed--and the capital investment required to support each energy segment. The global energy “industry” can be broadly categorized into two main segments: provision of fuels for transportation and production and distribution of electricity for residential and industrial consumption. The fuels sector encompasses the production, processing, and distribution of crude oil and its refined products, mostly gasoline, kerosene (which becomes jet fuel), diesel, gas oil and residual fuel oil. The electric power sector includes four related businesses: generation, transmission, distribution, and supply. The ongoing transformation of the global energy industry is being driven by the twin imperatives of meeting rising demand due to population growth and rising wealth and of addressing climate change through greener energy policies and massive capital investments by corporations and governments. The pathway to de-carbonizing electricity production and distribution by 2050 is fairly straightforward technologically, though doing so will require both scientific innovations (particularly regarding scalable battery storage) and sustained multi-trillion dollar annual investments for the next three decades. Decarbonizing transportation is a far more difficult and expensive proposition, and will require fundamental breakthroughs in multiple technologies, coupled with unusually far-sighted policy action. Extant academic research already provides useful guidance for policy makers in many areas, but far more will be required to help shape the future policy agenda.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123358613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the value relevance of acquired intangible assets using a comprehensive hand-collected dataset for 1,647 publicly listed US-firms from 2002 to 2018. This dataset allows us to disentangle acquired intangible assets into different classes (e.g., tech-, customer-, contract-, and marketing-intangible assets) and their respective economic lifetimes (i.e., definite vs indefinite useful lives) to test their relevance for equity investors. We predict and find positive associations for nearly all intangible assets, however with different economic significance. In particular, tech- and customer-related intangible assets are priced by equity investors. Furthermore, we find that definite intangible assets are more relevant than indefinite intangibles. These results are helpful for firms and their equity investors to understand the economic impact of intangible assets. Finally, the findings are particularly important for regulators given the recent proposition of the Financial Accounting Standards Board to subsume customer-related intangible assets and non-compete agreements into goodwill. While our results suggest that customer-related intangible assets are priced significantly by equity investors, this is not the case for non-compete agreements.
{"title":"The Pricing of Acquired Intangibles","authors":"W. Landsman, Alexander Liss, Soenke Sievers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3942328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942328","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the value relevance of acquired intangible assets using a comprehensive hand-collected dataset for 1,647 publicly listed US-firms from 2002 to 2018. This dataset allows us to disentangle acquired intangible assets into different classes (e.g., tech-, customer-, contract-, and marketing-intangible assets) and their respective economic lifetimes (i.e., definite vs indefinite useful lives) to test their relevance for equity investors. We predict and find positive associations for nearly all intangible assets, however with different economic significance. In particular, tech- and customer-related intangible assets are priced by equity investors. Furthermore, we find that definite intangible assets are more relevant than indefinite intangibles. These results are helpful for firms and their equity investors to understand the economic impact of intangible assets. Finally, the findings are particularly important for regulators given the recent proposition of the Financial Accounting Standards Board to subsume customer-related intangible assets and non-compete agreements into goodwill. While our results suggest that customer-related intangible assets are priced significantly by equity investors, this is not the case for non-compete agreements.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127034772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many organizations acknowledge that inclusiveness, or the practice of directly engaging colleagues in activities, is becoming increasingly important as businesses become more complex. However, inclusive managers remain significantly understudied in large-sample archival research, largely because inclusiveness is difficult to measure. We overcome this barrier and develop a measure of managers’ inclusiveness by observing the interactions among corporate managers during conference calls, the only circumstance where interactions among managers can be regularly observed. We examine inclusive managers’ characteristics, individual career outcomes, leadership team outcomes and firm outcomes. We find that inclusive managers are more likely to be female and older. They are twice as likely as the average manager to be promoted to CEO, and appointing an inclusive CEO increases the inclusiveness of the executive team. Teams composed of inclusive managers also have greater retention. Lastly, firms where inclusive managers are promoted to CEO experience more positive stock market reactions to the promotion announcements.
{"title":"Inclusive Managers","authors":"W. Cai, Ethan Rouen, Yuan Zou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3942049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942049","url":null,"abstract":"Many organizations acknowledge that inclusiveness, or the practice of directly engaging colleagues in activities, is becoming increasingly important as businesses become more complex. However, inclusive managers remain significantly understudied in large-sample archival research, largely because inclusiveness is difficult to measure. We overcome this barrier and develop a measure of managers’ inclusiveness by observing the interactions among corporate managers during conference calls, the only circumstance where interactions among managers can be regularly observed. We examine inclusive managers’ characteristics, individual career outcomes, leadership team outcomes and firm outcomes. We find that inclusive managers are more likely to be female and older. They are twice as likely as the average manager to be promoted to CEO, and appointing an inclusive CEO increases the inclusiveness of the executive team. Teams composed of inclusive managers also have greater retention. Lastly, firms where inclusive managers are promoted to CEO experience more positive stock market reactions to the promotion announcements.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122183464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, P. Jiraporn, Sirimon Treepongkaruna
Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a quasi-natural experiment, we explore how independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs possess the general managerial skills that can be applied across firms and industries. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent directors view generalist CEOs unfavorably. Firms forced to raise board independence experience a lower increase in CEO general ability than those not required to change board composition. Additional analysis confirms the results, including fixed- and random-effects regressions, propensity score matching, instrumental-variable analysis, and Oster’s (2019) technique for testing coefficient stability.
{"title":"How Do Independent Directors View Generalist vs. Specialist CEOs? Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Shock","authors":"Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, P. Jiraporn, Sirimon Treepongkaruna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3945686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3945686","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a quasi-natural experiment, we explore how independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs possess the general managerial skills that can be applied across firms and industries. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent directors view generalist CEOs unfavorably. Firms forced to raise board independence experience a lower increase in CEO general ability than those not required to change board composition. Additional analysis confirms the results, including fixed- and random-effects regressions, propensity score matching, instrumental-variable analysis, and Oster’s (2019) technique for testing coefficient stability.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130328344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study applies financial crises as an exogenous shock to family and non-family firms to identify differences in stock market performance. We investigate 278 firms listed on the German Stock Exchange in the world financial crisis starting in 2007 as well as the Euro crisis starting in 2010. Based on the methodology of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we form portfolios with and without family blockholders and apply equally- as well as value-weighted four-factor models to identify differences in stock market performance. Results show that family firms do not necessarily perform better than non-family firms in years of economic downturn. But our models suggest that they outperform non-family firms three years after the beginning of the world financial crisis and in and after the Euro crisis. This implies that family firms recover faster than their non-family counterparts. We follow that the financial preconditions of family firms, differing financial strategies during recessions and the controlling incentives and capacities that are rooted in the long-term orientation and risk aversion of family blockholders, as well as the country-specific corporate governance framework of Germany, explain these differences. The paper contributes to the ongoing academic exploration on family firm performance as well as crisis resilience of family firms and suggests practical implications for policymakers in countries with high levels of family ownership among firms
{"title":"Sunshine after the Rain? The Stock Market Performance of Family Firms In and After Financial Crises","authors":"Fabio Franzoi, M. Mietzner","doi":"10.22495/rgcv11i3p3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/rgcv11i3p3","url":null,"abstract":"This study applies financial crises as an exogenous shock to family and non-family firms to identify differences in stock market performance. We investigate 278 firms listed on the German Stock Exchange in the world financial crisis starting in 2007 as well as the Euro crisis starting in 2010. Based on the methodology of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we form portfolios with and without family blockholders and apply equally- as well as value-weighted four-factor models to identify differences in stock market performance. Results show that family firms do not necessarily perform better than non-family firms in years of economic downturn. But our models suggest that they outperform non-family firms three years after the beginning of the world financial crisis and in and after the Euro crisis. This implies that family firms recover faster than their non-family counterparts. We follow that the financial preconditions of family firms, differing financial strategies during recessions and the controlling incentives and capacities that are rooted in the long-term orientation and risk aversion of family blockholders, as well as the country-specific corporate governance framework of Germany, explain these differences. The paper contributes to the ongoing academic exploration on family firm performance as well as crisis resilience of family firms and suggests practical implications for policymakers in countries with high levels of family ownership among firms","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122643968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Family-owned companies occupy a large proportion of enterprises all over the world. It is meaningful for people to understand how family ownership may affect firms’ financing strategies. This paper tends to summarize the results of previous studies. However, different scholars reach different results of the correlation between family ownership and debt levels. Some scholars get the result of positive correlation, some get the negative correlation, and others conclude that the correlation does not exist. We apply corporate finance theories such as the pecking order theory, the agency cost theory, and the trade-off theory to previous studies to explain the differences. In the empirical analysis, we find that sample selection bias and omit variable bias exist in previous works. One significant reason that leads to the collisions among previous researchers is the ambiguous definition of family businesses and the disagreement about the definitions. Hence, we conclude several identities of family businesses and make some suggestions to future researchers.
{"title":"Review of the Effect of Family Ownership on Capital Structure","authors":"Zehao Chen, Siyuan Zhang, Jiaqi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3932810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3932810","url":null,"abstract":"Family-owned companies occupy a large proportion of enterprises all over the world. It is meaningful for people to understand how family ownership may affect firms’ financing strategies. This paper tends to summarize the results of previous studies. However, different scholars reach different results of the correlation between family ownership and debt levels. Some scholars get the result of positive correlation, some get the negative correlation, and others conclude that the correlation does not exist. We apply corporate finance theories such as the pecking order theory, the agency cost theory, and the trade-off theory to previous studies to explain the differences. In the empirical analysis, we find that sample selection bias and omit variable bias exist in previous works. One significant reason that leads to the collisions among previous researchers is the ambiguous definition of family businesses and the disagreement about the definitions. Hence, we conclude several identities of family businesses and make some suggestions to future researchers.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129008274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether connections through common business group affiliation affect media reporting on firms and whether firms experience any real effects consequently. We find that firms receive more positive coverage from connected newspapers. This result is robust to a DiD design and controlling for newspaper-firm pair fixed effects, and is stronger when business groups have more incentive and power to influence the newspapers and when firms need more positive media coverage. We further show that these firm-media connections undermine the newspaper’s information intermediary role, which affects firms’ information environment, costs of capital, and intensity of related party transactions.
{"title":"Common Business Group Affiliation, Media Reporting, and Firms’ Information Environment","authors":"Y. Ru, Feixue Xie, Jian Xue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3655874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655874","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether connections through common business group affiliation affect media reporting on firms and whether firms experience any real effects consequently. We find that firms receive more positive coverage from connected newspapers. This result is robust to a DiD design and controlling for newspaper-firm pair fixed effects, and is stronger when business groups have more incentive and power to influence the newspapers and when firms need more positive media coverage. We further show that these firm-media connections undermine the newspaper’s information intermediary role, which affects firms’ information environment, costs of capital, and intensity of related party transactions.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125800067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Relying on an unbalanced panel of firm-level data on Polish unlisted companies, we investigate the role of the capital maintenance principle in securing creditors’ interests. We document a persistently higher level of indebtedness among firms adhering to the capital maintenance principle. While the strength of the relationship is contingent on debt maturity, capital maintenance is found to be significant for both adjusting and non-adjusting creditors. Unlimited liability is evidenced to eliminate the need to maintain legal capital, thus demonstrating the notable role of legal capital in safeguarding creditors’ interests in cooperation with limited liability companies. In contrast with the viewpoint of the advocates of abandoning legal capital requirements, we show that legal capital remains an important mechanism for ensuring incentive compatibility between shareholders and creditors.
{"title":"The Capital Maintenance Principle Matters for Creditors","authors":"Tadeusz Dudycz, Paweł Mielcarz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3924627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3924627","url":null,"abstract":"Relying on an unbalanced panel of firm-level data on Polish unlisted companies, we investigate the role of the capital maintenance principle in securing creditors’ interests. We document a persistently higher level of indebtedness among firms adhering to the capital maintenance principle. While the strength of the relationship is contingent on debt maturity, capital maintenance is found to be significant for both adjusting and non-adjusting creditors. Unlimited liability is evidenced to eliminate the need to maintain legal capital, thus demonstrating the notable role of legal capital in safeguarding creditors’ interests in cooperation with limited liability companies. In contrast with the viewpoint of the advocates of abandoning legal capital requirements, we show that legal capital remains an important mechanism for ensuring incentive compatibility between shareholders and creditors.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116608363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns shares; and deviations fall more when the blockholder appoints a director to the firm. When a firm is above (below) target, blockholders are associated with less (more) inside debt and more (no change in) inside equity, implying there is no “one-size-fits-all” compensation change for blockholders. Outside debt and equity increase for both above and below target firms.
{"title":"New Active Blockholders and Adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios","authors":"Phuong Lan Nguyen, Neal Galpin, Garry J. Twite","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3918192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918192","url":null,"abstract":"We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns shares; and deviations fall more when the blockholder appoints a director to the firm. When a firm is above (below) target, blockholders are associated with less (more) inside debt and more (no change in) inside equity, implying there is no “one-size-fits-all” compensation change for blockholders. Outside debt and equity increase for both above and below target firms.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133066401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：