Modest versus ultra-modest dialetheism

Abstract

Jc Beall is known for defending modest dialetheism; this is the view that there are dialetheia, but only in the form of “spandrels” arising from otherwise reasonable semantic terminology (e.g., the Liar paradox). Beall regards the view as modest, partly because it adopts a deflationary view of truth, a view where “true” is merely a device of disquotational inference, one which expresses no “substantive property.” Beall supports deflationism by an appeal to Ockham’s razor; however, the premise that “true” is disquotational is found dubious. Nonetheless, we can craft an ultra-modest position which says merely that at least one utterance of “This sentence is not true” uses “true” as a disquotational device, and maintains neutrality on whether it expresses a substantive property. This is sufficient for the existence of at least one dialetheia, and can be justified by appeal to readily observable facts about linguistic usage. The limited scope of the ultra-modest view will be disappointing to formal semanticists hoping to capture the behavior of “true” throughout the language. But the ultra-modest basis gives dialetheism the best hope for wider acceptance in the discipline.