The Ethical Meaning of the “Inexpressible” of Wittgenstein and Benjamin

Abstract

The article draws parallels between the linguistic theories of Ludwig Wittgen­stein and Walter Benjamin’s ideas about the origin of language and its transfor­mations in our world today. Wittgenstein shows in the “Tractatus Logico-Phi­losophicus” the world as a whole, which is ordered in accordance with the grammatical structures of language. At the same time, it allows him to draw a certain border, beyond which is the “inexpressible”, namely, the sphere of ethi­cal values inaccessible to language. Benjamin’s approach to understanding lan­guage, on the contrary, seems completely illogical and irrational. The initial im­pulse here is the biblical myth of the creation of the world by the Word and the idea of language as a God-given gift to human. In the course of historical de­velopment, the power of language is gradually running out and moves further away from its sacred source. However, even in current language practices, it is still possible to recognize this prototype, which is present in speech in the form of the inexpressible. The religious connotations of the “inexpressible” don’t pre­vent Benjamin from associating it with the same area of moral reference that Wittgenstein characterized with the term “mystical”. The comparative analysis of the theories of Benjamin and Wittgenstein demonstrates that behind the dif­ferent strategies of philosophical understanding there is a common intention to catch the sphere of ethics that escapes direct expression. During the recon­struction of the teachings of two iconic figures of Western thought, important points of intersection are revealed: the tendency to ontologize language, the in­ability to express value meanings in normative statements, the incorporation of an ethical dimension into everyday practices of speech.