Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US, and Brazil

IF 1.4 3区 哲学 Q2 ETHICS Philosophical Psychology Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI:10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637
Paulo Sérgio Boggio, Gabriel Gaudêncio Rêgo, Jim A.C. Everett, Graziela Bonato Vieira, Rose Graves, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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Abstract

ABSTRACTMorality has traditionally been described in terms of an impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral psychological research has largely followed in this vein, focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness, manipulating whether the person doing the action was a friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e., conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are judged differently according to who committed them and according to the political ideology of the judges. We discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and the black sheep effect.KEYWORDS: Moral foundations theoryblack sheep effectmoral hypocrisymoral judgmentrefugeesingroupoutgroup Disclosure statementThere were no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with a direct financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript. All authors contributed to manuscript writing and approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.Open practices statementData, materials, and analysis codes can be found in the OSF website via the following link: https://osf.io/ge2mk/?view_only=82e54b480c5e40a38cd5530ab7032c77Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637Additional informationFundingThis research was supported by CAPES - PRINT (Programa Institucional de Internacionalização; Grant # 88887.310255/2018-00), CAPESP – PROEX (Grant 3 04236/2021), CNPq - INCT (National Institute of Science and Technology on Social and Affective Neuroscience, grant #. 406463/2022-0). PSB is supported by a CNPq researcher fellowship (309905/2019-2). GVB was supported by a scientific initiation grant: nº 2017/11131-0, São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). GGR was supported by a postdoc grant: nº 2019/26665-5 (FAPESP). WSA was supported by John Templeton Foundation grant 62280. JACE was supported by a Philip Leverhulme Prize from the Leverhulme Trust (PLP-2021-095).
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谁干的?我们和他们在英国、美国和巴西的道德错误
摘要传统上,道德被描述为一种公正客观的“道德法则”,道德心理学研究在很大程度上遵循了这一脉络,关注抽象的道德判断。但是,我们的道德判断是否不仅取决于行为本身,还取决于谁在做这件事?我们观察道德错误的等级,操纵做这件事的人是朋友、难民还是陌生人。我们研究了不同道德基础的评分,并在巴西、美国和英国的样本中进行了研究。我们最有力和一致的发现是,与未指定的代理人相比,内部成员犯下的纯洁性违规行为受到更严厉的评判,而难民和未指定代理人之间的差异从自由派到保守派逐渐减弱,即保守派对他们的评判比自由派更严厉,巴西参与者比美国和英国参与者更严厉。我们的研究结果表明,违反纯洁性的判断是不同的,根据谁犯了他们,根据法官的政治意识形态。我们根据群体动力学的各种理论,如道德伪善、道德脱离和害群之马效应来讨论这些发现。关键词:道德基础理论害群之马效应道德伪善道德判断难民群体披露声明与任何组织或实体没有关联或参与,与手稿中讨论的主题或材料有直接的经济利益。所有作者都参与了稿件的撰写,并批准了稿件的最终版本提交。开放实践声明数据、材料和分析代码可通过以下链接在OSF网站上找到:https://osf.io/ge2mk/?view_only=82e54b480c5e40a38cd5530ab7032c77Supplementary材料本文的补充数据可在线访问https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637Additional informationfunding本研究由CAPES - PRINT (Programa instituional de internacionaliza;资助号88887.310255/2018-00),CAPESP - PROEX(资助号04236/2021),CNPq - INCT(国家社会和情感神经科学技术研究所,资助号88887.310255/2018-00)。406463/2022-0)。PSB由CNPq研究员奖学金(309905/2019-2)资助。GVB得到了一项科学启动基金的支持:nº2017/11131-0,圣保罗研究基金会(FAPESP)。GGR获得博士后资助:nº2019/26665-5 (FAPESP)。WSA由约翰邓普顿基金会资助62280。JACE得到了利华休姆信托基金会的菲利普利华休姆奖(PLP-2021-095)的支持。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
14.30%
发文量
120
期刊介绍: Philosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research. Published articles deal with issues that arise in the cognitive and brain sciences, and in areas of applied psychology.
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