Truth-telling, promises and the shape of a character

Daniel Peixoto Murata
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Abstract

In this article I want to focus on a specific function that promises fulfil in our lives: their role as a way of shaping our character. To make my case, I will present an account of truth-telling based on Bernard Williams’ work on genealogy and on the virtues of truth. This account will highlight how our selves (or characters) are not static entities in time, that they are not immediately transparent to us. Nonetheless, we seem to have what I call a drive to be someone, to have a character. We need ways to ‘steady the mind’, that is, ways of shaping our selves to whom we are or want to be. The argument I will put forward is that promises are one of the resources we have for doing so. By making promises, we commit ourselves to acting in a certain way and by doing that we also shape our selves. The argument will help us to answer some philosophical challenges raised against promises, notably about their rationality and about their relationship with vows and resolutions. Additionally, it will impact our thinking about contract law. What emerges from this article is an account of an important role played by promises that has been often neglected by the literature.
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说真话,承诺和塑造一个人的性格
在这篇文章中,我想把重点放在承诺在我们生活中实现的一个特定功能上:它们作为塑造我们性格的一种方式。为了证明我的观点,我将根据伯纳德·威廉姆斯关于家谱学和真理的优点的研究,对讲真话进行阐述。这将强调我们的自我(或角色)在时间上不是静态的实体,它们对我们来说不是立即透明的。尽管如此,我们似乎有一种我称之为成为某人的动力,有一种性格。我们需要“稳定思想”的方法,也就是说,让我们自己成为我们是谁或想成为谁的方法。我要提出的论点是,承诺是我们这样做的资源之一。通过做出承诺,我们承诺自己以某种方式行动,通过这样做,我们也塑造了自己。这个论点将帮助我们回答一些反对承诺的哲学挑战,特别是关于承诺的合理性以及它们与誓言和决心的关系。此外,它还会影响我们对合同法的思考。从这篇文章中出现的是对承诺所起的重要作用的描述,而这些承诺经常被文献所忽视。
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来源期刊
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0.60
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期刊介绍: The Rivista di Filosofia del diritto (Journal of Legal Philosophy) publishes highly qualified scientific contributions on matters related to Philosophy and Theory of Law, Legal Sociology and related fields of research. Its publication is promoted by the Italian Association for Legal Philosophy (Italian Section of the Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie), being its Official journal. It is aimed also at promoting the encounter and exchange between Italian and foreign legal-philosophical traditions. Two issues per year will be published, and articles submitted will be reviewed under the best European standards of evaluation.
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Is the rule of recognition really a duty-imposing rule? Truth-telling, promises and the shape of a character Hans Kelsen, Legal Scientist The limits of constituent power? Vice and illiberalism Sovereignty and constituent power: reimagining the process of constituent power through the politico-legal matrix of sovereignty
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