Sound-based Two-Factor Authentication: Vulnerabilities and Redesign

Abstract

Reducing the level of user effort involved in traditional two-factor authentication (TFA) constitutes an important research topic. An interesting representative approach, Sound-Proof , leverages ambient sounds to detect the proximity between the second-factor device (phone) and the login terminal (browser), and eliminates the need for the user to transfer PIN codes. In this paper, we identify a weakness of the Sound-Proof system that makes it completely vulnerable to passive “environment guessing” and active “environment manipulating” remote attackers and proximity attackers. Addressing these security issues, we propose Listening-Watch , a new TFA mechanism based on a wearable device (watch/bracelet) and active browser-generated random speech sounds. As the user attempts to log in, the browser populates a short random code encoded into speech, and the login succeeds if the watch’s audio recording contains this code (decoded using speech recognition ), and is similar enough to the browser’s audio recording. The remote attacker, who has guessed/manipulated the user’s environment, will be defeated since authentication success relies upon the presence of the random code in watch’s recordings. The proximity attacker will also be defeated unless it is extremely close (< 50 cm) to the watch since the wearable microphones are usually designed to capture only nearby sounds (e.g., voice commands).