Intention-based social influence in (non)strategic sharing experiments

Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Güth, Marcello Puca, Patrizia Sbriglia
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Abstract

Abstract We experimentally study intention-based social influence in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games with bi-dimensional strategy vectors let individuals decide independently in the role of proposer and responder and allow fairness intentions to be role dependent. Uni-dimensional strategy vectors in modified games constrain individuals to consistent offers and acceptance thresholds. To induce social influence, we randomly match participants in groups of four, which are minimally identified by colors. Social influence is assessed by how one reacts to information about median group intention(s). The $$2\times 2$$ 2 × 2 factorial experimental design varies the order of the two game types and the strategy vector dimensionality. Social influence, depending on the game type and strategy dimensionality, significantly impacts participants’ behavior compared to their own intention. At the aggregate level, however, these differences cancel each other out. As there are more constraints on the action space, uni-dimensionality increases strategic concerns.
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(非)策略分享实验中基于意向的社会影响
摘要实验研究了标准和改进的最后通牒和有罪不罚博弈中基于意向的社会影响。具有二维策略向量的标准博弈让个体独立决定提议者和回应者的角色,并允许公平意图依赖于角色。修改博弈中的单维策略向量约束个体一致的出价和接受阈值。为了诱导社会影响,我们将参与者随机配对为四人一组,这是最小的颜色识别。社会影响是通过一个人对群体意向中位数信息的反应来评估的。$$2\times 2$$ 2 × 2阶乘实验设计改变了两种游戏类型的顺序和策略向量维度。根据游戏类型和策略维度的不同,社会影响对参与者行为的影响显著高于其自身意图。然而,在总体水平上,这些差异相互抵消。由于行动空间受到更多限制,单维性增加了战略关注。
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