Pub Date : 2024-01-07DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00153-3
Mehmet Y. Gürdal, Orhan Torul, Mustafa Yahşi
{"title":"The seeds of success: the pivotal role of first round cooperation in public goods games","authors":"Mehmet Y. Gürdal, Orhan Torul, Mustafa Yahşi","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00153-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00153-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"20 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139448431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-28DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00152-4
Tianyi Li, C. Noussair
{"title":"Conditional cooperation and group size: experimental evidence from a public good game","authors":"Tianyi Li, C. Noussair","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00152-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00152-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"36 1","pages":"1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139225471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00149-z
Hayk Amirkhanyan, Michał Krawczyk, Maciej Wilamowski, Paweł Bokszczanin
Abstract In this project, we manipulate the public observability of forecasts and outcomes of a physical task. We explore how these manipulations affect overconfidence (OC). Participants in the experiment are asked to hold a weight after predicting how long they think they could do it for. Comparing the prediction and outcome times (in seconds) yields a measure of OC. We independently vary two dimensions of public observability (of the outcome and of the prediction). Additionally, we manipulate incentives to come up with an accurate prediction. This design allows us to shed light on the mechanism behind male and female OC. Following the existing literature, we formulate several hypotheses regarding the differences in predictions and outcomes for males and females in the presence of the public observability of predictions and outcomes. Our experimental data do not provide support to most of the hypotheses: in particular, there is no evidence of a gender gap in overconfidence. The most robust finding that emerges from our results is that incentives on making correct predictions increase participants’ forecasts on their own performance (by about 24%) and their actual performance as well, but to a lower extent (by about 8%); in addition, incentives to predict correctly in fact increase error for females (by about 33%).
{"title":"Overconfidence: the roles of gender, public observability and incentives","authors":"Hayk Amirkhanyan, Michał Krawczyk, Maciej Wilamowski, Paweł Bokszczanin","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00149-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00149-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this project, we manipulate the public observability of forecasts and outcomes of a physical task. We explore how these manipulations affect overconfidence (OC). Participants in the experiment are asked to hold a weight after predicting how long they think they could do it for. Comparing the prediction and outcome times (in seconds) yields a measure of OC. We independently vary two dimensions of public observability (of the outcome and of the prediction). Additionally, we manipulate incentives to come up with an accurate prediction. This design allows us to shed light on the mechanism behind male and female OC. Following the existing literature, we formulate several hypotheses regarding the differences in predictions and outcomes for males and females in the presence of the public observability of predictions and outcomes. Our experimental data do not provide support to most of the hypotheses: in particular, there is no evidence of a gender gap in overconfidence. The most robust finding that emerges from our results is that incentives on making correct predictions increase participants’ forecasts on their own performance (by about 24%) and their actual performance as well, but to a lower extent (by about 8%); in addition, incentives to predict correctly in fact increase error for females (by about 33%).","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"70 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135266132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5
Chi Trieu
{"title":"Who’s who: how uncertainty about the favored group affects outcomes of affirmative action","authors":"Chi Trieu","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00143-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"SE-9 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135411647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00151-5
Michael Kosfeld, Zahra Sharafi
Abstract We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences—trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity—predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (Manag Sci, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455 ). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.
{"title":"The Preference Survey Module: evidence on social preferences from Tehran","authors":"Michael Kosfeld, Zahra Sharafi","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00151-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00151-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences—trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity—predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (Manag Sci, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455 ). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135667319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-14DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00150-6
Urs Fischbacher, Levent Neyse, David Richter, Carsten Schröder
Abstract While laboratory and field experiments are the major items in the toolbox of behavioral economists, household panel studies can complement them and expand their research potential. We introduce the German Socio-Economic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), which offers researchers detailed panel data and the possibility to collect personalized experimental and survey data for free. We discuss what SOEP-IS can offer to behavioral economists and illustrate a set of design ideas with examples. Although we build our discussion on SOEP-IS, our purpose is to provide a guide that can be generalized to other household panel studies as well.
{"title":"Adding household surveys to the behavioral economics toolbox: insights from the SOEP innovation sample","authors":"Urs Fischbacher, Levent Neyse, David Richter, Carsten Schröder","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00150-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00150-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While laboratory and field experiments are the major items in the toolbox of behavioral economists, household panel studies can complement them and expand their research potential. We introduce the German Socio-Economic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), which offers researchers detailed panel data and the possibility to collect personalized experimental and survey data for free. We discuss what SOEP-IS can offer to behavioral economists and illustrate a set of design ideas with examples. Although we build our discussion on SOEP-IS, our purpose is to provide a guide that can be generalized to other household panel studies as well.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135803395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-08DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7
Fabian Dvorak
Abstract stratEst is a software package for strategy frequency estimation in the freely available statistical computing environment R (R Development Core Team in R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 2022). The package aims at minimizing the start-up costs of running the modern strategy frequency estimation techniques used in experimental economics. Strategy frequency estimation (Stahl and Wilson in J Econ Behav Organ 25: 309–327, 1994; Stahl and Wilson in Games Econ Behav, 10: 218–254, 1995) models the choices of participants in an economic experiment as a finite-mixture of individual decision strategies. The parameters of the model describe the associated behavior of each strategy and its frequency in the data. stratEst provides a convenient and flexible framework for strategy frequency estimation, allowing the user to customize, store and reuse sets of candidate strategies. The package includes useful functions for data processing and simulation, strategy programming, model estimation, parameter testing, model checking, and model selection.
stratEst是一个在免费提供的统计计算环境R (R Foundation for statistical computing, Vienna, 2022)中进行策略频率估计的软件包。该包旨在最小化运行实验经济学中使用的现代策略频率估计技术的启动成本。策略频率估计(Stahl and Wilson, journal of economic behavior, 25: 309-327, 1994);Stahl和Wilson在《游戏经济行为》(Games economics behavior, 10: 218-254, 1995)中将参与者在经济实验中的选择建模为个体决策策略的有限混合。模型的参数描述了每个策略的相关行为及其在数据中的频率。stratEst为策略频率估计提供了一个方便灵活的框架，允许用户自定义、存储和重用候选策略集。该软件包包括数据处理和仿真、策略规划、模型估计、参数测试、模型检查和模型选择的有用功能。
{"title":"stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation","authors":"Fabian Dvorak","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract stratEst is a software package for strategy frequency estimation in the freely available statistical computing environment R (R Development Core Team in R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 2022). The package aims at minimizing the start-up costs of running the modern strategy frequency estimation techniques used in experimental economics. Strategy frequency estimation (Stahl and Wilson in J Econ Behav Organ 25: 309–327, 1994; Stahl and Wilson in Games Econ Behav, 10: 218–254, 1995) models the choices of participants in an economic experiment as a finite-mixture of individual decision strategies. The parameters of the model describe the associated behavior of each strategy and its frequency in the data. stratEst provides a convenient and flexible framework for strategy frequency estimation, allowing the user to customize, store and reuse sets of candidate strategies. The package includes useful functions for data processing and simulation, strategy programming, model estimation, parameter testing, model checking, and model selection.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00142-6
Brett Williams
Abstract I find necessary and sufficient conditions for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations for choices from a budget line of Arrow securities. Applying this characterization to existing data, I compare FOSD violation rates across a broad set of risk preference elicitation tasks.
{"title":"Violations of first-order stochastic dominance","authors":"Brett Williams","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00142-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00142-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I find necessary and sufficient conditions for first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) violations for choices from a budget line of Arrow securities. Applying this characterization to existing data, I compare FOSD violation rates across a broad set of risk preference elicitation tasks.","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3
Daniel L. Chen, Martin Schonger
{"title":"Invariance of equilibrium to the strategy method I: theory","authors":"Daniel L. Chen, Martin Schonger","doi":"10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-023-00145-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":91563,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Economic Science Association","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135436042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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