Conditional Political Cycles in Africa: Myth or Reality?

Abstract

Abstract This study tests for the presence of political cycles in Africa. Through an analysis encompassing data from 30 African nations over the period 1980–2020, we ask whether political incumbents in Africa rely on monetary and fiscal policy variables to improve their reelection prospects. In particular, we test for the existence of ‘conditional political cycles’, namely, we show that both government consumption and money growth go up during an election year, even when we account for critical institutional factors such as government attributes and political regimes. Our findings reveal a noticeable upswing in both government consumption and money growth during election years, a trend that holds consistent even after controlling for key institutional variables. Further exploration, however, unveils that this phenomenon is nuanced, particularly in the case of political monetary cycles; in particular, our analysis shows that when an African country is classified as a democracy during an election year, broad money falls. But although robust institutions can curtail the intensity of political monetary cycles, they do not exert a similar effect on fiscal variables. Finally, we test for the presence of ‘political credit cycles’ and find no empirical evidence that African incumbents manipulate credit markets to bolster their electoral outcomes.