MiFID II unbundling and sell-side analyst research

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101617
Mark Lang , Jedson Pinto , Edward Sul
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Abstract

We examine broad effects of MiFID II, which mandated unbundled pricing of analyst research in the European Union beginning in 2018. We find significant reductions in sell-side analyst following, particularly for firms for which the marginal analyst was less important (larger, older, less volatile firms with greater coverage and more accurate forecasts). High quality analysts (more accurate, experienced, and in positions of seniority) were more likely to leave the sell-side and move to the buy-side, while remaining sell-side analysts increased efforts to make their forecasts more informative (more accurate, more detailed, and more likely to include informative recommendations resulting in larger stock price responses). Firms responded to a loss of sell-side coverage with more frequent, forward-looking, and informative investor relations events, especially for firms that lost the most coverage. Our results support recent theoretical analysis predicting that unbundling had significant implications for sell-side research, buy-side research, and firm responses.

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MiFID II 拆分与卖方分析师研究
我们研究了 MiFID II 的广泛影响,MiFID II 强制规定从 2018 年开始在欧盟对分析师研究进行非捆绑定价。我们发现,卖方分析师的追随率大幅下降,尤其是对于边际分析师不那么重要的公司(规模较大、历史较久、波动较小、覆盖面较广、预测更准确的公司)。高质量的分析师(更准确、经验更丰富、职位更高)更有可能离开卖方而转投买方,而留下来的卖方分析师则更加努力地使其预测更具信息性(更准确、更详细、更有可能包含信息性建议,从而带来更大的股价反应)。公司通过更频繁、更具前瞻性和信息量更大的投资者关系活动来应对卖方报道的流失,尤其是对于失去报道最多的公司。我们的研究结果支持最近的理论分析,即松绑对卖方研究、买方研究和公司反应都有重大影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
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