{"title":"Government resource allocation through related party transactions: Evidence from China","authors":"Lu Wang, Jing Chi, Jing Liao","doi":"10.1177/03128962231203520","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using unique hand-collected data of related party transactions (RPTs) between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government noncorporate agencies in China, we investigate the behavior of government resource allocation and its impacts. We find that Chinese governments are more likely to allocate resources to SOEs with a politically connected chairperson of the board through RPTs. The results remain robust after considering endogeneity concerns. In SOEs with a politically connected chairperson, resources obtained through RPTs are not associated with improved economic outputs except for increased investment expenditures. In addition, resources obtained are associated with improved labor cost stickiness. Our results add new evidence of the political exchange between Chinese governments and SOEs facilitated by politically connected executives. JEL Classification: G30, G38","PeriodicalId":47209,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Australian Journal of Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/03128962231203520","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Using unique hand-collected data of related party transactions (RPTs) between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government noncorporate agencies in China, we investigate the behavior of government resource allocation and its impacts. We find that Chinese governments are more likely to allocate resources to SOEs with a politically connected chairperson of the board through RPTs. The results remain robust after considering endogeneity concerns. In SOEs with a politically connected chairperson, resources obtained through RPTs are not associated with improved economic outputs except for increased investment expenditures. In addition, resources obtained are associated with improved labor cost stickiness. Our results add new evidence of the political exchange between Chinese governments and SOEs facilitated by politically connected executives. JEL Classification: G30, G38
期刊介绍：
The objectives of the Australian Journal of Management are to encourage and publish research in the field of management. The terms management and research are both broadly defined. The former includes the management of firms, groups, industries, regulatory bodies, government, and other institutions. The latter encompasses both discipline- and problem-based research. Consistent with the policy, the Australian Journal of Management publishes research in accounting, applied economics, finance, industrial relations, political science, psychology, statistics, and other disciplines, provided the application is to management, as well as research in areas such as marketing, corporate strategy, operations management, organisation development, decision analysis, and other problem-focuses paradigms.
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