Collusion or governance? Common ownership and corporate risk-taking

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI:10.1111/corg.12562
Shouyu Yao, Xinyu Guo, Ahmet Sensoy, John W. Goodell, Feiyang Cheng
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Abstract

Research Question

Disputes over the corporate governance impacts of common ownership continue. Differentiating from existing studies, we focus on the Chinese stock market, exploiting the Top 10 Shareholding File, which includes various investors besides institutional investors, to study the impact of common ownership built through blockholders on corporate risk-taking behavior.

Research Findings

We find that firms with higher common ownership are less likely to engage in corporate risk-taking, with concomitant decreases in future growth rates. Mechanism analysis shows that blockholders' common ownership exerts its influence through increasing market concentration, with concomitant lessening of market competition. Interestingly, further analyses indicate that, in contrast to blockholders, ownership connectedness built by mutual fund families significantly raises corporate risk-taking along with growth. However, individual investors' common ownership does not show the significant statistical relationship with corporate risk-taking.

Theoretical Implications

We add to the debate on common ownership on corporate governance. Consistent with the anti-competition stream of literature, the risk-taking-reduction role we identify for blockholder common ownership supports the theory of anti-competition. Our results highlight the need to consider the heterogeneity of common ownership.

Policy Implications

While blockholder common ownership is evidenced to have a negative effect on corporate risk-taking, with, by extension, a negative impact on economic development, our results also suggest that efficient monitoring mitigates these effects. We also document an interesting heterogeneity in investor types. Mutual fund common ownership, in contrast to blockholder common ownership, is associated with higher risk-taking and more robust firm growth. This suggests the positive role of institutions in corporate governance and the necessity of considering the heterogeneity of common ownership.

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合谋还是治理?共同所有权与公司风险承担
研究问题 关于共同持股对公司治理影响的争议仍在继续。与现有研究不同的是,我们以中国股市为研究对象,利用除机构投资者外还包括各类投资者的十大持股档案,研究通过大股东建立的共同所有权对公司风险承担行为的影响。 研究结果 我们发现,共同持股比例越高的公司越不可能进行公司风险承担,其未来增长率也会随之下降。机制分析表明,大股东的共同所有权通过提高市场集中度来施加影响,同时削弱市场竞争。有趣的是,进一步的分析表明,与大股东不同,共同基金家族建立的所有权联系在显著提高企业风险承担能力的同时,也促进了企业的增长。然而,个人投资者的共同所有权并没有显示出与企业风险承担之间的显著统计关系。 理论意义 我们为共同所有权对公司治理的影响这一争论添砖加瓦。与反竞争的文献流派一致,我们发现的大股东共同所有权在降低风险承担方面的作用支持了反竞争理论。我们的研究结果凸显了考虑共同所有权异质性的必要性。 政策启示 我们的研究结果表明,大股东共同所有权对企业承担风险有负面影响,进而对经济发展产生负面影响,但我们的研究结果也表明,有效的监督可以减轻这些影响。我们还记录了投资者类型的有趣异质性。共同基金的共同所有权与大股东的共同所有权相反,与更高的风险承担和更强劲的企业增长相关。这表明机构在公司治理中的积极作用以及考虑共同所有权异质性的必要性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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