Salah-Mohammad triangular distribution Curve is an Alternative to the Laffer curve

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY Accounts of Chemical Research Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.3934/jdg.2023021
Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian
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Abstract

Today, financing the government's expenses through taxes is the main and, at the same time, the most stable method, with the least negative economic consequences, stabilizing the economy by adopting optimal policies in recession and inflation conditions. The costs for the government have increased due to the extent of the government's obligations in the economic and social fields, requiring the implementation of ways to increase tax revenues and obtain resources to cover these costs. This paper deals with modeling the game between the taxpayers and the tax administration to achieve the factors affecting the optimal performance tax rate and determine the optimal performance tax rate. Assuming that the income of the tax affairs organization (government) is distributed triangularly in the interval [0, 1], and the quality of the investigating group is not known to the taxpayers, the proposed game is solved, and theorems are presented. The results showed that the income of the tax affairs organization had an inverse relationship with investigation costs and a direct relationship with the fines received from the taxpayers. Also, under certain conditions, the income of the tax affairs organization increases with the increase in the quality of the assessment groups. Finally, there was an inverse relationship between the optimal tax rate and the variables of investigating quality and diagnostic tax.
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萨拉赫-穆罕默德三角分布曲线是拉弗曲线的另一种选择
今天,通过税收为政府开支融资是主要的,同时也是最稳定的方法,对经济的负面影响最小,在经济衰退和通货膨胀的情况下通过采取最优政策来稳定经济。由于政府在经济和社会领域的义务范围扩大,政府的成本增加,需要实施增加税收收入和获得资源来弥补这些成本的方法。本文对纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈进行建模,得出影响最优绩效税率的因素,确定最优绩效税率。假设税务组织(政府)的收入在区间[0,1]内呈三角形分布,并且纳税人不知道调查小组的质量,求解了所提出的博弈,并给出了定理。结果表明,税务机关的收入与调查费用呈反比关系,与纳税人的罚款呈直接关系。此外,在一定条件下,税务机构的收入随着评估小组质量的提高而增加。最后,最优税率与调查质量和诊断税变量呈反比关系。
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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