{"title":"<i>Dreams for a Decade: International Nuclear Abolitionism and the End of the Cold War</i> by Stephanie L. Freeman","authors":"Matthew A. Evangelista","doi":"10.1162/jcws_r_01164","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Histories of the end of the Cold War have credited a range of actors, from leaders and diplomats to grassroots activists in peace and human-rights movements, some of whom engaged in collaboration across state borders. Stephanie Freeman's Dreams for a Decade is unusual in its focus on both top political figures and transnational movements. She places them all in the category of “nuclear abolitionists” and argues that their commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons helped bring the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet arms race to an end and contributed to the emergence (at least temporarily) of a reunified, peaceful, and democratic Europe. Freeman excavates an impressive range of English-language primary and secondary sources, from archives of popular movements to declassified records of U.S. National Security Council deliberations. She relies on copies of materials from the National Security Archive (a private repository in Washington, DC) and the Vitalii Kataev collection at the Hoover Institution Archives for insights into the Soviet side.The book opens by citing The Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race, the document drafted mainly by Randall Forsberg, founder of the Boston-based Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), which launched the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze. Freeman then introduces a parallel initiative, promoted in England by historian E. P. Thompson and political scientist Mary Kaldor, among others, that led to the formation of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement for a nuclear-free Europe. Freeman has worked in the archives of the Freeze movement at Swarthmore College and of END at the London School of Economics. One of the book's most valuable contributions is her detailed recounting of the internal debates within the movements that produced distinct but complementary policies.Another key contribution is Freeman's focus on the level of national political leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union, where she identifies two leading abolitionist leaders: U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Among their achievements was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in December 1987, the first agreement that led to the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons—intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Freeman's archival research on the U.S. side is particularly impressive, as she traces the impact of the Freeze and END movements on the internal deliberations of the Reagan administration. Popular pressure spurred the administration to propose arms talks with the USSR much sooner than it would otherwise have done and to introduce numerous initiatives, such as the “zero option” for INF, and, paradoxically, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to create a system of defenses against ballistic missiles. SDI, dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics, nearly derailed the process of nuclear disarmament that both Reagan and Gorbachev endorsed. The issue was not so much that Gorbachev feared SDI per se—it was primarily a basic research program that never did produce a system that could render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” as Reagan had originally promised. Rather, the Soviet leader worried that efforts to counter or imitate SDI, enthusiastically pursued by the Soviet military-industrial establishment, would undermine his plans to demilitarize the Soviet economy and focus on civilian needs, and that it could spark an arms race in space-based weapons.Freeman's parallel treatment of nuclear abolitionism at the level of government leadership and mass movements constitutes an effective organizing principle for her work. Yet there are some important differences between the two levels. Freeman typically describes Reagan's approach as the “peace through strength'' disarmament strategy” (e.g., pp. 77, 130). Reagan promoted a major military buildup, with a generation of new nuclear weapons, along with substantial increases in military spending, in the hope of pressuring the Soviet side to agree to nuclear disarmament. But that strategy depended entirely on the Soviet response. Gorbachev was probably unique among Soviet leaders in favoring nuclear abolition. His predecessors reacted to Reagan's “disarmament strategy” by breaking off arms talks and increasing deployments of their own weapons (pp. 115, 126). Reagan's own camp included few supporters of nuclear abolition. As Freeman carefully evaluates the evidence, she finds only Secretary of State George Shultz supportive of Reagan's goals (he later became one of the “gang of four” former U.S. officials to embrace “global zero”). Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger favored the military buildup for its own sake and resisted any efforts at negotiations. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane wanted to use SDI as a “bargaining chip” to trade for Soviet reductions but remained committed to nuclear deterrence. George H. W. Bush, Reagan's vice president and successor, emerges as a key opponent of nuclear disarmament. As Gorbachev embraced the goals of the END movement and pushed for total denuclearization of Europe, Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, worried that plans to modernize the Lance short-range nuclear missiles deployed in West Germany would be undermined. If the Freeze, END, Gorbachev, and Reagan are the heroes of Freeman's story, Bush is undoubtedly the villain. She suggests that his hesitation in responding to Gorbachev's vision of a “common European home” in favor of a settlement on U.S. terms set the stage for the current dismal situation—the déjà vu all over again of a new division of Europe, except with the Iron Curtain pushed to the east, and new nuclear deployments by Russia and the United States.Freeman's treatment of the Malta summit of December 1989 effectively reveals Bush's lack of “the vision thing” (the phrase he himself used as a reminder of what he should project), especially compared to Gorbachev and the transnational coalition of European supporters of disarmament and human rights. A fascinating contribution of the book is its tracing of the contacts between the END activists and the dissidents associated with Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, the Polish movement Wolność i Pokój (Freedom and Peace), and East German feminists. The Soviet-bloc activists criticized the European disarmament proponents for insufficient attention to human rights and the repression inflicted by Communist authorities against any independent activity—even in support of peace initiatives the government ostensibly supported. The work of Daniel Thomas and Sarah Snyder has called attention to the “Helsinki Effect”—the way figures such as Václav Havel sought to use the Communist governments’ signature on the human-rights agreements of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to demand their compliance. But Freeman's is the most detailed account of how the East-bloc activists convinced the END movement to embrace their goal, and, indeed, how the latter influenced Gorbachev's thinking on the “common European home” (although here one would hope to find more evidence than the author's reliance on the testimony of Tair Tairov, Aleksei Pankin, and Yurii Zhukov, none of whom had access to high-level Soviet decision-making).Freeman's treatment of the evolution of END's strategy compared to that of the Freeze is revealing. The Freeze movement caught the popular imagination, leading to local and state-level referenda in support of the initiative and a massive rally in New York City in June 1982. Sooner than Forsberg's multi-year strategy had envisioned, the Freeze entered the partisan political realm, with watered-down versions adopted by many Democrats, including Reagan's 1984 presidential rival, Walter Mondale. Much of the campaign's attention became focused on legislation, including efforts to cut funding for particular weapons (pp. 128–129). As END broadened its horizons, the Freeze narrowed its strategy.One element that could have strengthened this excellent study would have been discussion of the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear disarmament. European peace researchers had sought to strengthen their case for nuclear disarmament by promoting initiatives for so-called non-offensive or non-provocative defense—and their work ultimately found expression in Gorbachev's December 1988 speech at the United Nations announcing a unilateral reduction of half a million Soviet troops and a defensive restructuring of the armed forces. In the United States, Forsberg and other critics of the “deadly connection” between nuclear deterrence and military intervention were also searching for ways to make nuclear weapons superfluous by reducing the offensive potential of conventional forces. Freeman mentions that President Bush invited Forsberg to meet with him on the eve of the Malta summit to discuss arms control issues and European security. Freeman implies that the invitation was little more than a gesture of courtesy toward a prominent anti-nuclear activist (p. 237), but in fact, as the records of Forsberg's IDDS (recently made available at the Cornell University Library) reveal, the meeting was substantive. Forsberg used the occasion to try to convince Bush that restructuring and reduction of conventional forces would make Europe safe for nuclear disarmament, but ultimately he was unwilling to accept that argument. More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, with Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine, Europe again faces the prospect of nuclear war. The dreams of nuclear abolition, so effectively recounted in this superb study, remain unfulfilled.","PeriodicalId":45551,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cold War Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cold War Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_01164","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Histories of the end of the Cold War have credited a range of actors, from leaders and diplomats to grassroots activists in peace and human-rights movements, some of whom engaged in collaboration across state borders. Stephanie Freeman's Dreams for a Decade is unusual in its focus on both top political figures and transnational movements. She places them all in the category of “nuclear abolitionists” and argues that their commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons helped bring the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet arms race to an end and contributed to the emergence (at least temporarily) of a reunified, peaceful, and democratic Europe. Freeman excavates an impressive range of English-language primary and secondary sources, from archives of popular movements to declassified records of U.S. National Security Council deliberations. She relies on copies of materials from the National Security Archive (a private repository in Washington, DC) and the Vitalii Kataev collection at the Hoover Institution Archives for insights into the Soviet side.The book opens by citing The Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race, the document drafted mainly by Randall Forsberg, founder of the Boston-based Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS), which launched the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze. Freeman then introduces a parallel initiative, promoted in England by historian E. P. Thompson and political scientist Mary Kaldor, among others, that led to the formation of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement for a nuclear-free Europe. Freeman has worked in the archives of the Freeze movement at Swarthmore College and of END at the London School of Economics. One of the book's most valuable contributions is her detailed recounting of the internal debates within the movements that produced distinct but complementary policies.Another key contribution is Freeman's focus on the level of national political leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union, where she identifies two leading abolitionist leaders: U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Among their achievements was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in December 1987, the first agreement that led to the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons—intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Freeman's archival research on the U.S. side is particularly impressive, as she traces the impact of the Freeze and END movements on the internal deliberations of the Reagan administration. Popular pressure spurred the administration to propose arms talks with the USSR much sooner than it would otherwise have done and to introduce numerous initiatives, such as the “zero option” for INF, and, paradoxically, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to create a system of defenses against ballistic missiles. SDI, dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics, nearly derailed the process of nuclear disarmament that both Reagan and Gorbachev endorsed. The issue was not so much that Gorbachev feared SDI per se—it was primarily a basic research program that never did produce a system that could render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” as Reagan had originally promised. Rather, the Soviet leader worried that efforts to counter or imitate SDI, enthusiastically pursued by the Soviet military-industrial establishment, would undermine his plans to demilitarize the Soviet economy and focus on civilian needs, and that it could spark an arms race in space-based weapons.Freeman's parallel treatment of nuclear abolitionism at the level of government leadership and mass movements constitutes an effective organizing principle for her work. Yet there are some important differences between the two levels. Freeman typically describes Reagan's approach as the “peace through strength'' disarmament strategy” (e.g., pp. 77, 130). Reagan promoted a major military buildup, with a generation of new nuclear weapons, along with substantial increases in military spending, in the hope of pressuring the Soviet side to agree to nuclear disarmament. But that strategy depended entirely on the Soviet response. Gorbachev was probably unique among Soviet leaders in favoring nuclear abolition. His predecessors reacted to Reagan's “disarmament strategy” by breaking off arms talks and increasing deployments of their own weapons (pp. 115, 126). Reagan's own camp included few supporters of nuclear abolition. As Freeman carefully evaluates the evidence, she finds only Secretary of State George Shultz supportive of Reagan's goals (he later became one of the “gang of four” former U.S. officials to embrace “global zero”). Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger favored the military buildup for its own sake and resisted any efforts at negotiations. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane wanted to use SDI as a “bargaining chip” to trade for Soviet reductions but remained committed to nuclear deterrence. George H. W. Bush, Reagan's vice president and successor, emerges as a key opponent of nuclear disarmament. As Gorbachev embraced the goals of the END movement and pushed for total denuclearization of Europe, Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, worried that plans to modernize the Lance short-range nuclear missiles deployed in West Germany would be undermined. If the Freeze, END, Gorbachev, and Reagan are the heroes of Freeman's story, Bush is undoubtedly the villain. She suggests that his hesitation in responding to Gorbachev's vision of a “common European home” in favor of a settlement on U.S. terms set the stage for the current dismal situation—the déjà vu all over again of a new division of Europe, except with the Iron Curtain pushed to the east, and new nuclear deployments by Russia and the United States.Freeman's treatment of the Malta summit of December 1989 effectively reveals Bush's lack of “the vision thing” (the phrase he himself used as a reminder of what he should project), especially compared to Gorbachev and the transnational coalition of European supporters of disarmament and human rights. A fascinating contribution of the book is its tracing of the contacts between the END activists and the dissidents associated with Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, the Polish movement Wolność i Pokój (Freedom and Peace), and East German feminists. The Soviet-bloc activists criticized the European disarmament proponents for insufficient attention to human rights and the repression inflicted by Communist authorities against any independent activity—even in support of peace initiatives the government ostensibly supported. The work of Daniel Thomas and Sarah Snyder has called attention to the “Helsinki Effect”—the way figures such as Václav Havel sought to use the Communist governments’ signature on the human-rights agreements of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to demand their compliance. But Freeman's is the most detailed account of how the East-bloc activists convinced the END movement to embrace their goal, and, indeed, how the latter influenced Gorbachev's thinking on the “common European home” (although here one would hope to find more evidence than the author's reliance on the testimony of Tair Tairov, Aleksei Pankin, and Yurii Zhukov, none of whom had access to high-level Soviet decision-making).Freeman's treatment of the evolution of END's strategy compared to that of the Freeze is revealing. The Freeze movement caught the popular imagination, leading to local and state-level referenda in support of the initiative and a massive rally in New York City in June 1982. Sooner than Forsberg's multi-year strategy had envisioned, the Freeze entered the partisan political realm, with watered-down versions adopted by many Democrats, including Reagan's 1984 presidential rival, Walter Mondale. Much of the campaign's attention became focused on legislation, including efforts to cut funding for particular weapons (pp. 128–129). As END broadened its horizons, the Freeze narrowed its strategy.One element that could have strengthened this excellent study would have been discussion of the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear disarmament. European peace researchers had sought to strengthen their case for nuclear disarmament by promoting initiatives for so-called non-offensive or non-provocative defense—and their work ultimately found expression in Gorbachev's December 1988 speech at the United Nations announcing a unilateral reduction of half a million Soviet troops and a defensive restructuring of the armed forces. In the United States, Forsberg and other critics of the “deadly connection” between nuclear deterrence and military intervention were also searching for ways to make nuclear weapons superfluous by reducing the offensive potential of conventional forces. Freeman mentions that President Bush invited Forsberg to meet with him on the eve of the Malta summit to discuss arms control issues and European security. Freeman implies that the invitation was little more than a gesture of courtesy toward a prominent anti-nuclear activist (p. 237), but in fact, as the records of Forsberg's IDDS (recently made available at the Cornell University Library) reveal, the meeting was substantive. Forsberg used the occasion to try to convince Bush that restructuring and reduction of conventional forces would make Europe safe for nuclear disarmament, but ultimately he was unwilling to accept that argument. More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, with Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine, Europe again faces the prospect of nuclear war. The dreams of nuclear abolition, so effectively recounted in this superb study, remain unfulfilled.
里根的副总统和继任者布什是核裁军的主要反对者。当戈尔巴乔夫接受“终结”运动的目标并推动欧洲全面无核化时,布什和他的国家安全顾问布伦特·斯考克罗夫特(Brent Scowcroft)担心,部署在西德的“长矛”(Lance)短程核导弹现代化的计划会受到破坏。如果说“冻结”、“终结”、戈尔巴乔夫和里根是弗里曼故事中的英雄,那么布什无疑是反派。她认为,他在回应戈尔巴乔夫的“欧洲共同家园”愿景时犹豫不决,赞成按照美国的条件解决问题,这为目前的惨淡局面奠定了基础——欧洲重新分裂的局面再次出现,除了铁幕向东推进,以及俄罗斯和美国新的核部署。弗里曼对1989年12月马耳他峰会的处理有效地揭示了布什缺乏“远见”(他自己用这个词来提醒自己应该展示什么),特别是与戈尔巴乔夫和欧洲裁军和人权支持者的跨国联盟相比。这本书的一个引人入胜的贡献是它追踪了END活动家与捷克斯洛伐克《77宪章》、波兰运动Wolność i Pokój(自由与和平)和东德女权主义者之间的联系。苏联集团的积极分子批评欧洲的裁军支持者对人权关注不够,以及共产党当局对任何独立活动的镇压——即使是支持政府表面上支持的和平倡议。丹尼尔·托马斯和萨拉·斯奈德的研究引起了人们对“赫尔辛基效应”的关注——Václav哈维尔等人试图利用共产党政府在欧洲安全与合作会议人权协议上的签名来要求他们遵守。但是,对于东方阵营的活动人士如何说服END运动接受他们的目标,以及后者如何影响戈尔巴乔夫关于“欧洲共同家园”的思想,Freeman的书是最详细的描述(尽管在这里,人们希望找到比作者对泰尔·塔伊罗夫、阿列克谢·潘金和尤里·朱可夫的证词更多的证据,他们都没有接触过苏联高层决策)。Freeman将END的策略演变与《冻结》的策略进行了比较,这很有启发意义。“冻结”运动引起了大众的注意,导致地方和州级的公民投票支持该倡议,并于1982年6月在纽约市举行了大规模集会。早在福斯伯格的多年战略设想中,“冻结”就进入了党派政治领域,许多民主党人采用了淡化版,包括里根1984年的总统竞选对手沃尔特·蒙代尔。这场运动的大部分注意力集中在立法上,包括削减特定武器资金的努力(第128-129页)。随着END扩大了视野,Freeze缩小了战略范围。本可以加强这项出色研究的一个因素是讨论常规部队与核裁军之间的关系。欧洲和平研究人员曾试图通过推动所谓的非进攻性或非挑衅性防御来加强他们的核裁军理由,他们的工作最终体现在戈尔巴乔夫1988年12月在联合国发表的演讲中,他宣布单方面裁减50万苏联军队,并对武装力量进行防御性重组。在美国,福斯伯格和其他批评核威慑与军事干预之间存在“致命联系”的人,也在寻求通过降低常规力量的进攻潜力,使核武器变得多余的方法。弗里曼提到,布什总统邀请福斯伯格在马耳他峰会前夕与他会晤,讨论军备控制问题和欧洲安全问题。弗里曼暗示,这次邀请只不过是对一位著名的反核活动家的一种礼貌姿态(第237页),但事实上,正如福斯伯格的IDDS记录(最近在康奈尔大学图书馆提供)所显示的那样,这次会议是实质性的。福斯伯格利用这个机会试图说服布什,重组和削减常规力量将使欧洲在核裁军方面变得安全,但最终他不愿接受这种说法。冷战结束30多年后,随着俄罗斯野蛮入侵乌克兰,欧洲再次面临核战争的前景。废除核武器的梦想,在这本出色的研究中如此有效地叙述,仍然没有实现。