“Just BEAT it” do firms reclassify costs to avoid the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) of the TCJA?

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101648
Stacie O. Kelley , Christina M. Lewellen , Daniel P. Lynch , David M.P. Samuel
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Abstract

This study empirically examines whether firms reclassify related-party payments to avoid the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). We leverage the BEAT filing threshold and use both a difference-in-differences design among U.S. firms and a triple-difference design utilizing the parent company's location to provide evidence that firms reclassify related-party payments to avoid the BEAT. This effect is stronger in firms with greater pre-TCJA income shifting incentives. We estimate a $6 billion aggregate reduction in U.S. taxes for our sample firms in 2018. We also examine the consequences of reclassifying related-party payments and find some evidence of an increase in tax reserves and a reduction in internal information quality for firms that engage in cost reclassification to avoid the BEAT. These findings help explain observed BEAT collection shortfalls, contribute to the current policy debate about international tax reform, and document spillover effects of tax policy.

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公司是否会 "只是为了避免税基侵蚀和反滥用税(BEAT)"而对成本进行重新分类?
本研究实证检验了企业是否为规避《减税与就业法案》(TCJA)中的税基侵蚀和反滥用税(BEAT)而对关联方付款进行重新分类。我们利用《税基侵蚀和反滥用税法》的申报门槛,在美国公司中采用差分设计,并利用母公司所在地进行三重差分设计,以提供企业为规避《税基侵蚀和反滥用税法》而对关联方付款进行重新分类的证据。这种效应在 TCJA 前收入转移动机较强的公司中更为明显。我们估计,2018 年样本企业在美国的纳税总额将减少 60 亿美元。我们还研究了关联方付款重新分类的后果,发现一些证据表明,为规避 BEAT 而进行成本重新分类的企业,其税收准备金会增加,内部信息质量会下降。这些发现有助于解释观察到的 BEAT 征收不足,有助于当前关于国际税制改革的政策辩论,并记录了税收政策的溢出效应。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
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