Raising the Pension Age

IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI:10.1111/1467-923x.13268
Deborah Mabbett
{"title":"Raising the Pension Age","authors":"Deborah Mabbett","doi":"10.1111/1467-923x.13268","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"WHILE PRESIDENT Emmanuel Macron faced street protests over raising the pension age from 62 to 64 in France, the UK government quietly shelved a plan to bring forward an increase in the State Pension age (SPA) to 68 into the 2030s. Major increases have already been implemented. For men the SPA has increased from 65 to 66 and an increase to 67 is going ahead over the period 2026–2028. For women there has been a steeper path (60 in 2010, 66 in 2020 and henceforth in line with men). There has been some protest from women who argued that there was insufficient notice of the steep rise in the 2010s, but otherwise the government faced little resistance. Why has it been rather easy to raise the pension age in the UK? Is it that we have been pummelled into passivity by relentless austerity? Perhaps younger Britons do not protest because they do not think that there will be a state pension for them anyway, so there is no intergenerational contract to maintain. The policy of subsidising private provision pursued by successive governments has produced very large inequalities in the experience of retirement and aging, and these suppress political mobilisation. The protests in France suggest that some idea of solidarity survives there; silence in the UK signifies that it's everyone for themselves. But doesn't this mean that the UK is better placed to respond to the exigencies of an aging population, while the French struggle to adjust to the new reality? We are relentlessly primed in expert commentaries to think that raising the pension age is an appropriate and effective response to longer life expectancy. In 2014 the government legislated for periodic expert reviews of the SPA which would implement the rule that individuals spend on average around one-third of their adult lives in receipt of the state pension. The decision not to proceed with an accelerated rise invoked this logic: life expectancy has not increased as expected, so the pension age should be held accordingly. Framing the pension age as a technical problem is well understood as a way of trying to remove the policy from political contestation. But it is also a way of defining, or redefining, what the pension is for. The link to life expectancy communicates that state pensions insure against the risk of living a long life and running out of savings (longevity risk). But the old age pension has always had another purpose, which is to insure against the risk of forced retirement. The age-based pension provides cover for a number of contingencies that may mean having to stop work: declining health, limited job opportunities, the need to care for aging relatives or partners. Unlike disability and unemployment benefits, eligibility is straightforward and can be relied upon in planning. There is flexibility: the age-based pension provides a kind of basic income to which earnings can be added if the opportunity arises. Understanding the old age pension as providing protection against a bundle of risks has several implications. Bundling together risks that affect different groups in the community differently is a way of securing political support for the measure. Those who can comfortably extend their working lives care about the old age pension because they are more likely to live longer and run down their assets. Those who cannot easily work to a ripe old age care about the pension because it provides a basic level of security at a point where paid work has become less accessible. The actually-existing pension, which pays a flat amount from a certain age without a retirement condition, is not perfectly designed for either of these risks, but it ties the fortunes of the two groups together. Linking the pension age to life expectancy has the effect of securing insurance against longevity risk, while curtailing insurance against forced retirement risk. The independent review conducted in 2017 by John Cridland cannot be accused of ignoring this issue. It presented an abundance of information about variation in healthy life expectancy across local areas and socioeconomic groups, and expressed concern that those experiencing ill health and disability, along with carers, would suffer a disproportionate impact from increases in the SPA. Submissions to the review proposed various ways of addressing this, such as regional variations in the SPA and earlier access to the state pension subject to actuarial reductions. However, the review concluded that there was no effective mechanism for targeting those with lower life expectancy, and the SPA should rise in accordance with the ‘one third’ rule. Reforms to working age employment rights and benefits should manage the unequal consequences, including means-tested early access to a pensioner benefit for carers and those with disabilities. It is worth emphasising just how limited the insurance against forced retirement risk provided by the benefits system is, compared with the state pension. Basic rates of benefit for people of working age are less than half the state pension level. The single-tier state pension (STP) will be £203.75 per week in 2023/24, while the standard allowance for a single Universal Credit recipient aged over 25 will be £85 per week. Even a person in very poor health who gets through all the hoops for qualifying for a severe incapacity premium will only get three-quarters of the amount payable to a person who has crossed the age threshold. While forced retirement falls most heavily on those with low lifetime earnings, the risks of poor health or care obligations do affect middle class people too. Large parts of the welfare state rely on a kind of propitious selection, whereby well-off people who have a low risk of bad things happening, but also a low tolerance of risk, are prepared to pay over the odds to ensure that the welfare state is there for them. Political support for the NHS benefits from this logic, although it will be undermined if service standards continue to slip and more of those who can afford it seek private alternatives. When it comes to the old age pension, propitious selection has been deeply undermined by pension privatisation. Private pension pots can be accessed without penalty from the age of 55. (This will rise to 57, but the plan is to maintain a ten-year gap to the SPA, which gives a clue about how the government expects private pensions to be used.) Many pots are too small to secure a comfortable old age, but they are often large enough to cover a gap between retirement and receipt of the state pension. In other words, the ‘pension freedoms’ introduced by George Osborne in 2014 were perfectly designed to ameliorate concerns that middle income voters might have about raising the SPA. Supporters of raising the SPA might object that the primary aim of the policy is to alter conventions about retirement to ensure that people plan to work longer. While raising the pension age is also a regressive reform to the benefits system, this is an unfortunate side effect, not the main issue. It is true that, cross-nationally, norms about retirement are somewhat aligned with pension ages, and people often speak of the retirement age and the pension age interchangeably. However, there are reasons to doubt whether past evidence will be a reliable guide to future behaviour. The strongest alignments between pensions and retirement arose when the pension age was fixed for a long period (in the UK, the age was 60 for women and 65 for men for six decades—from the introduction of National Insurance in 1948 to 2010). Changes in the pension age can be accompanied by quite substantial disalignment. Despite the importance attached by policy makers to giving advance notice of higher pension ages, pre-announcement of the increase in women's pension age made little difference to retirement norms. The plan to increase the pension age for women to 65 starting in 2010 was announced and legislated for in 1995, but a survey of over-50s in 2006 found that, on average, respondents thought that women were ‘too old to work’ at 61.1 Polling data also suggests that people's views are not very sensitive to policy changes. YouGov's state pension age tracker shows a clear plurality (around 40 per cent) of respondents think that the age should be 65, a figure that has declined only fractionally since the tracker started in 2019, despite the pension age reaching 66 for everyone in 2020. It remains that a rule that links the pension age to life expectancy makes intuitive sense to people worried about the sustainability of pensions in the face of demographic aging. It is assumed that failure to follow the rule means that people of working age will be overburdened with the cost of paying for current pensions, exacerbating intergenerational unfairness. This is indeed what happens if the government relies on National Insurance (NI) as the main source of funding, as NI is only paid by those of working age. It is built on a redundant model in which wages and salaries were the only source of household income. A fairer model would tap the non-wage income and asset wealth of older people, where income inequality is now as great as among those of working age. The real betrayal of younger generations that is happening now arises from astonishingly regressive decisions such as raising the ceiling for tax relief on pension contributions and committing to protect housing wealth from care costs by imposing a health and social care levy on NI (a reform cancelled in the Kwarteng budget and not reinstated since). Even the Johnson government noticed that the care reform was grotesquely unfair to younger generations and the minor, but symbolically important, decision was made to extend the levy to the wage income of old age pensioners, although their non-wage income escaped unscathed. The policy of raising the SPA was initiated by the Conservatives in 1995 and endorsed by Labour when it was in government, with both parties favouring expert reviews to implement life expectancy linking of the pension age. Under Corbyn this was rowed back, but we have yet to see what the Starmer regime will bring. In an ideal world, the plight of older people unable to work to the SPA would mobilise wider attention to the unrelenting meanness of the working age benefits system. Meanwhile, demographic aging means that more people should work longer, but many of those best placed to do so have ample savings and assets, and can afford to ignore the SPA. Raising the SPA will do nothing about the most pressing labour supply issue currently, which is declining participation among those aged 50–66. Addressing that issue means fixing the health and social care systems: urgent tasks which are a good deal more difficult than raising the pension age. 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引用次数: 0

Abstract

WHILE PRESIDENT Emmanuel Macron faced street protests over raising the pension age from 62 to 64 in France, the UK government quietly shelved a plan to bring forward an increase in the State Pension age (SPA) to 68 into the 2030s. Major increases have already been implemented. For men the SPA has increased from 65 to 66 and an increase to 67 is going ahead over the period 2026–2028. For women there has been a steeper path (60 in 2010, 66 in 2020 and henceforth in line with men). There has been some protest from women who argued that there was insufficient notice of the steep rise in the 2010s, but otherwise the government faced little resistance. Why has it been rather easy to raise the pension age in the UK? Is it that we have been pummelled into passivity by relentless austerity? Perhaps younger Britons do not protest because they do not think that there will be a state pension for them anyway, so there is no intergenerational contract to maintain. The policy of subsidising private provision pursued by successive governments has produced very large inequalities in the experience of retirement and aging, and these suppress political mobilisation. The protests in France suggest that some idea of solidarity survives there; silence in the UK signifies that it's everyone for themselves. But doesn't this mean that the UK is better placed to respond to the exigencies of an aging population, while the French struggle to adjust to the new reality? We are relentlessly primed in expert commentaries to think that raising the pension age is an appropriate and effective response to longer life expectancy. In 2014 the government legislated for periodic expert reviews of the SPA which would implement the rule that individuals spend on average around one-third of their adult lives in receipt of the state pension. The decision not to proceed with an accelerated rise invoked this logic: life expectancy has not increased as expected, so the pension age should be held accordingly. Framing the pension age as a technical problem is well understood as a way of trying to remove the policy from political contestation. But it is also a way of defining, or redefining, what the pension is for. The link to life expectancy communicates that state pensions insure against the risk of living a long life and running out of savings (longevity risk). But the old age pension has always had another purpose, which is to insure against the risk of forced retirement. The age-based pension provides cover for a number of contingencies that may mean having to stop work: declining health, limited job opportunities, the need to care for aging relatives or partners. Unlike disability and unemployment benefits, eligibility is straightforward and can be relied upon in planning. There is flexibility: the age-based pension provides a kind of basic income to which earnings can be added if the opportunity arises. Understanding the old age pension as providing protection against a bundle of risks has several implications. Bundling together risks that affect different groups in the community differently is a way of securing political support for the measure. Those who can comfortably extend their working lives care about the old age pension because they are more likely to live longer and run down their assets. Those who cannot easily work to a ripe old age care about the pension because it provides a basic level of security at a point where paid work has become less accessible. The actually-existing pension, which pays a flat amount from a certain age without a retirement condition, is not perfectly designed for either of these risks, but it ties the fortunes of the two groups together. Linking the pension age to life expectancy has the effect of securing insurance against longevity risk, while curtailing insurance against forced retirement risk. The independent review conducted in 2017 by John Cridland cannot be accused of ignoring this issue. It presented an abundance of information about variation in healthy life expectancy across local areas and socioeconomic groups, and expressed concern that those experiencing ill health and disability, along with carers, would suffer a disproportionate impact from increases in the SPA. Submissions to the review proposed various ways of addressing this, such as regional variations in the SPA and earlier access to the state pension subject to actuarial reductions. However, the review concluded that there was no effective mechanism for targeting those with lower life expectancy, and the SPA should rise in accordance with the ‘one third’ rule. Reforms to working age employment rights and benefits should manage the unequal consequences, including means-tested early access to a pensioner benefit for carers and those with disabilities. It is worth emphasising just how limited the insurance against forced retirement risk provided by the benefits system is, compared with the state pension. Basic rates of benefit for people of working age are less than half the state pension level. The single-tier state pension (STP) will be £203.75 per week in 2023/24, while the standard allowance for a single Universal Credit recipient aged over 25 will be £85 per week. Even a person in very poor health who gets through all the hoops for qualifying for a severe incapacity premium will only get three-quarters of the amount payable to a person who has crossed the age threshold. While forced retirement falls most heavily on those with low lifetime earnings, the risks of poor health or care obligations do affect middle class people too. Large parts of the welfare state rely on a kind of propitious selection, whereby well-off people who have a low risk of bad things happening, but also a low tolerance of risk, are prepared to pay over the odds to ensure that the welfare state is there for them. Political support for the NHS benefits from this logic, although it will be undermined if service standards continue to slip and more of those who can afford it seek private alternatives. When it comes to the old age pension, propitious selection has been deeply undermined by pension privatisation. Private pension pots can be accessed without penalty from the age of 55. (This will rise to 57, but the plan is to maintain a ten-year gap to the SPA, which gives a clue about how the government expects private pensions to be used.) Many pots are too small to secure a comfortable old age, but they are often large enough to cover a gap between retirement and receipt of the state pension. In other words, the ‘pension freedoms’ introduced by George Osborne in 2014 were perfectly designed to ameliorate concerns that middle income voters might have about raising the SPA. Supporters of raising the SPA might object that the primary aim of the policy is to alter conventions about retirement to ensure that people plan to work longer. While raising the pension age is also a regressive reform to the benefits system, this is an unfortunate side effect, not the main issue. It is true that, cross-nationally, norms about retirement are somewhat aligned with pension ages, and people often speak of the retirement age and the pension age interchangeably. However, there are reasons to doubt whether past evidence will be a reliable guide to future behaviour. The strongest alignments between pensions and retirement arose when the pension age was fixed for a long period (in the UK, the age was 60 for women and 65 for men for six decades—from the introduction of National Insurance in 1948 to 2010). Changes in the pension age can be accompanied by quite substantial disalignment. Despite the importance attached by policy makers to giving advance notice of higher pension ages, pre-announcement of the increase in women's pension age made little difference to retirement norms. The plan to increase the pension age for women to 65 starting in 2010 was announced and legislated for in 1995, but a survey of over-50s in 2006 found that, on average, respondents thought that women were ‘too old to work’ at 61.1 Polling data also suggests that people's views are not very sensitive to policy changes. YouGov's state pension age tracker shows a clear plurality (around 40 per cent) of respondents think that the age should be 65, a figure that has declined only fractionally since the tracker started in 2019, despite the pension age reaching 66 for everyone in 2020. It remains that a rule that links the pension age to life expectancy makes intuitive sense to people worried about the sustainability of pensions in the face of demographic aging. It is assumed that failure to follow the rule means that people of working age will be overburdened with the cost of paying for current pensions, exacerbating intergenerational unfairness. This is indeed what happens if the government relies on National Insurance (NI) as the main source of funding, as NI is only paid by those of working age. It is built on a redundant model in which wages and salaries were the only source of household income. A fairer model would tap the non-wage income and asset wealth of older people, where income inequality is now as great as among those of working age. The real betrayal of younger generations that is happening now arises from astonishingly regressive decisions such as raising the ceiling for tax relief on pension contributions and committing to protect housing wealth from care costs by imposing a health and social care levy on NI (a reform cancelled in the Kwarteng budget and not reinstated since). Even the Johnson government noticed that the care reform was grotesquely unfair to younger generations and the minor, but symbolically important, decision was made to extend the levy to the wage income of old age pensioners, although their non-wage income escaped unscathed. The policy of raising the SPA was initiated by the Conservatives in 1995 and endorsed by Labour when it was in government, with both parties favouring expert reviews to implement life expectancy linking of the pension age. Under Corbyn this was rowed back, but we have yet to see what the Starmer regime will bring. In an ideal world, the plight of older people unable to work to the SPA would mobilise wider attention to the unrelenting meanness of the working age benefits system. Meanwhile, demographic aging means that more people should work longer, but many of those best placed to do so have ample savings and assets, and can afford to ignore the SPA. Raising the SPA will do nothing about the most pressing labour supply issue currently, which is declining participation among those aged 50–66. Addressing that issue means fixing the health and social care systems: urgent tasks which are a good deal more difficult than raising the pension age. The government would be lucky if it only had Macron's travails to contend with.
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提高领取养老金的年龄
工作年龄人口的基本福利率还不到国家养老金水平的一半。在2023/24年度,单层国家养老金(STP)将为每周203.75英镑,而25岁以上的单一通用信贷受益人的标准津贴将为每周85英镑。即使是一个健康状况非常差的人,通过了所有符合严重丧失工作能力保险费资格的条件,也只能得到超过年龄门槛的人应得金额的四分之三。虽然被迫退休对那些终身收入较低的人影响最大,但健康状况不佳或医疗义务不佳的风险确实也影响到中产阶级。福利国家的很大一部分依赖于一种有利选择,即那些发生坏事的风险较低,但对风险的容忍度也较低的富人,准备好付出高于赔率的代价,以确保福利国家为他们服务。对NHS的政治支持受益于这种逻辑,尽管如果服务标准继续下滑,更多有能力的人寻求私人替代方案,这种支持将被削弱。在养老保险方面,养老金私有化已经严重破坏了有利选择。从55岁起,可以免费领取私人养老金。(这一数字将上升到57,但计划是与SPA保持10年的差距,这为政府期望如何使用私人养老金提供了线索。)许多养老基金规模太小,无法保障一个舒适的晚年生活,但它们往往足够填补退休和领取国家养老金之间的缺口。换句话说,乔治·奥斯本(George Osborne)在2014年引入的“养老金自由”,完美地缓解了中等收入选民可能对提高SPA的担忧。支持提高SPA的人可能会反对说,该政策的主要目的是改变有关退休的惯例,以确保人们计划工作更长时间。虽然提高退休年龄也是福利制度的倒退改革,但这是一个不幸的副作用,而不是主要问题。的确,在国际上,关于退休的规范在某种程度上与领取养老金的年龄是一致的,人们经常把退休年龄和领取养老金的年龄混为一谈。然而,有理由怀疑过去的证据是否能作为未来行为的可靠指南。当领取养老金的年龄在很长一段时间内固定时,养老金和退休年龄之间的最紧密联系就出现了(在英国,从1948年引入国民保险到2010年,女性的年龄为60岁,男性为65岁,持续了60年)。领取养老金年龄的变化可能伴随着相当严重的失调。尽管决策者重视提前通知提高领取养老金年龄,但提前宣布提高妇女领取养老金年龄对退休规范的影响不大。从2010年开始将女性领取养老金的年龄提高到65岁的计划于1995年宣布并立法,但2006年对50岁以上人群的一项调查发现,受访者平均认为女性“年龄太大,不能工作”,年龄为61.1岁。民调数据还表明,人们的观点对政策变化并不十分敏感。YouGov的国家养老金年龄追踪显示,明显多数(约40%)的受访者认为年龄应该是65岁,尽管2020年每个人的养老金年龄都达到66岁,但自2019年开始追踪以来,这一数字仅略有下降。在人口老龄化的背景下,对于那些担心养老金可持续性的人来说,将领取养老金年龄与预期寿命挂钩的规则仍然具有直观的意义。人们认为,如果不遵守这一规定,就意味着处于工作年龄的人将因支付当前养老金的成本而负担过重,从而加剧了代际不公平。如果政府依赖国民保险(NI)作为主要资金来源,这确实会发生,因为NI只由工作年龄的人支付。它建立在一个冗余的模型之上,在这个模型中,工资和薪金是家庭收入的唯一来源。一个更公平的模式是利用老年人的非工资收入和资产财富,现在老年人的收入差距与工作年龄的人一样大。现在发生的对年轻一代的真正背叛来自于令人惊讶的累退决策,比如提高养老金的税收减免上限,并承诺通过对NI征收健康和社会护理税来保护住房财富免受护理成本的影响(这一改革在Kwarteng预算中被取消,此后一直没有恢复)。就连约翰逊政府也注意到,护理改革对年轻一代和未成年人极不公平,但具有重要象征意义的是,政府决定将征税范围扩大到领取养老金的老年人的工资收入,尽管他们的非工资收入毫发无损。 提高SPA的政策是由保守党于1995年发起的,并在工党执政时得到了工党的支持,两党都赞成专家审查,以实施与养老金年龄挂钩的预期寿命。在科尔宾的领导下,这种情况得到了扭转,但我们还没有看到斯塔默政权将带来什么。在一个理想的世界里,老年人不能在社会福利计划中工作的困境会引起更广泛的关注,让人们关注到工作年龄福利制度的无情无情。与此同时,人口老龄化意味着更多的人应该工作更长时间,但许多最适合这样做的人有充足的储蓄和资产,可以忽略SPA。目前最紧迫的劳动力供应问题是,50-66岁人群的劳动参与率正在下降,提高最低工资标准对这个问题毫无帮助。要解决这个问题,就意味着要修复健康和社会保障体系:这是一项比提高领取养老金年龄困难得多的紧迫任务。如果政府只有马克龙那样的阵痛需要应对,那将是幸运的。
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Political Quarterly
Political Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-
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期刊介绍: Since its foundation in 1930, The Political Quarterly has explored and debated the key issues of the day. It is dedicated to political and social reform and has long acted as a conduit between policy-makers, commentators and academics. The Political Quarterly addresses current issues through serious and thought-provoking articles, written in clear jargon-free English."The Political Quarterly plays host to some of the best writing about both topical issues and underlying trends in UK and European politics"Professor Lord Raymond Plant
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