The Predicament of Practical Reason

IF 1.1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Kantian Review Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1017/s1369415423000201
Jakob Huber
{"title":"The Predicament of Practical Reason","authors":"Jakob Huber","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000201","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Lea Ypi, Kant’s attempt in the first Critique to unify reason via the practical route fails because his notion of purposiveness as design commits him to a dogmatic metaphysics. I challenge this claim on two grounds. First, I argue that practical reason does not have an interest in a strong modal connection that guarantees the unity of freedom and nature rather than a weak modal connection that merely affirms the possibility of our ends. Second, I highlight that the epistemic status of practical ideas is one of faith or hope rather than knowledge. Hence, Kant’s attempt to unify reason via the practical route can be reconstructed in a way that is largely in line with the commitments of his critical philosophy.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"191 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kantian Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000201","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract According to Lea Ypi, Kant’s attempt in the first Critique to unify reason via the practical route fails because his notion of purposiveness as design commits him to a dogmatic metaphysics. I challenge this claim on two grounds. First, I argue that practical reason does not have an interest in a strong modal connection that guarantees the unity of freedom and nature rather than a weak modal connection that merely affirms the possibility of our ends. Second, I highlight that the epistemic status of practical ideas is one of faith or hope rather than knowledge. Hence, Kant’s attempt to unify reason via the practical route can be reconstructed in a way that is largely in line with the commitments of his critical philosophy.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
实践理性的困境
伊皮认为,康德在《第一批判》中试图通过实践路线统一理性的尝试失败了,因为他的目的性即设计的概念使他陷入了教条主义的形而上学。我从两个方面质疑这种说法。首先,我认为实践理性对保证自由和自然统一的强模态联系不感兴趣,而对仅仅肯定我们的目的的可能性的弱模态联系不感兴趣。其次,我强调实用观念的认识论地位是一种信仰或希望,而不是知识。因此,康德通过实践路线统一理性的尝试可以在很大程度上与他的批判哲学的承诺相一致的方式进行重构。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Kantian Review
Kantian Review PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
20.00%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: The journal aims to publish the best contemporary work on Kant and Kantian issues and places an emphasis on those current philosophical debates which reflect a Kantian influence. Almost all recent Western philosophy makes some reference to the work of Kant, either consciously rejecting or consciously endorsing some aspect of that work. In epistemology, in philosophy of mind and language, in moral and political philosophy, and in aesthetics, such Kantian influences are widely acknowledged and extensively discussed. Kant"s work has also increasingly become a concern for the social and political sciences. The journal strengthens this interest both by establishing interpretations of Kant"s own writing and by discussing the substance of the related current philosophical debates.
期刊最新文献
Analytic Cognition in Kant American Reconstruction and the Abolition of Second Slavery: On Pascoe’s Intersectional Critique of Kant’s Theory of Labour Individual Maxim Tokens, not Abstract Maxim Types Kant’s Critique of the Ontological Argument: Comments on Ian Proops’s The Fiery Test of Critique Kant on the Conceptual Possibility of Actually Infinite Tota Synthetica
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1