Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique Decaix (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique Decaix Brian Francis Conolly Véronique Decaix. Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2021. Pp. 336. Paperback, $48.00. Dietrich of Freiberg's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect, as presented in his De origine rerum praedicamentalium, has proved unusually resistant to contextualization within the philosophical and theological discussions at the University of Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth century. There is little indication in the quodlibet literature that any of his contemporaries were aware of his unusual doctrine, let alone interested in responding to it, and Dietrich himself provides few hints as to which quaestiones of contemporary interest he is responding to. One therefore welcomes this study by Véronique Decaix in which it is argued that "il est irréfutable que les concepts centraux du De origine ont été forgés dans une discussion permanente avec Henri de Gand" (223). Drawing upon and developing the work of Pasquale Porro, Jan Aersten, and others, Decaix establishes Dietrich's indebtedness to Henry of Ghent, all while providing a comprehensive and remarkably clear, detailed, and precise presentation of Dietrich's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect. [End Page 706] Particularly noteworthy is the manner in which Decaix clarifies that there are several distinct ways in which the intellect, on Dietrich's theory, exercises its constitutive power. Thus, for instance, "categorial constitution," whereby certain relations and the six posterior relative categories are constituted, is distinguished from "quidditative constitution," wherein a real natural thing is constituted in its quidditative being, which is at the same time the mode or manner in which the intellect constitutes its own proper object. Decaix clarifies that such modes of constitution differ not only with respect to what is constituted, but by the kind of causality exercised by the intellect. Categorial constitution is a kind of formal causality—because it concerns only accidents, and because intellect grasps these accidents "sur une modalité déduite d'un élément extrinsèque" (284)—whereas quidditative constitution is efficient—it is "plus fondamentale, car elle est plus essentielle et plus intérieure" and "s'exerce sur la forme substantielle et cause l'étant en tant qu'étant" (286). In either case, whether the mode of constitution is categorial or quidditative, Decaix makes clear that constitution is not creation, and does not pertain to the reality or absolute entity of the thing affected by the intellect's constitutive power. Rather, constitution in the relevant sense here entails introducing and imposing upon the real natural thing a new mode of being: with respect to categorial constitution, that mode of being is ad aliud (to be in relation to another); with respect to quidditative constitution, the constituted mode of being is quidditative being. Decaix argues that Dietrich consciously develops his theory of categorial relation within the framework provided by Henry of Ghent. She cites as evidence, among other factors, that Dietrich concludes his analysis of categorial relation with what Decaix calls the "exacte contre-pied" (154) to question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX: "Utrum circumscripta re sui fundamenti relatio possit signari per nomen primae impositionis?" Dietrich in effect responds: "Si autem ab huiusmodi entibus removeamus actum rationis, tunc secundum nullum modum sunt entia quantum ad id, quod significatur per nomen, sed relinquitur sola realitas et entitas fundamenti" (160). Question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX is still more important for Decaix's argument. For she sees herein more than a germ of Dietrich's doctrine of the constitutive power of the intellect. As Decaix explains, in addition to the real foundation (quantity or quality) provided by nature, and the pure ratio of relation, provided by the intellect, Henry introduces the modus characterizatus a re, whereby the peculiar nature of the foundation (e.g. the length or the color) particularizes the general notion of the pure relation (157–58). Thus, the real, particular relation, for example, "is shorter than" or "is similar to," arises only from both nature and the intellect as joint contributing causes. In this...