Corruption and digital authoritarianism: political drivers of e-government adoption in Central Asia

Abstract

ABSTRACTWhy do some autocratic countries embrace digital authoritarianism and others do not? The literature describes the political benefits of e-government for autocrats, but not the political costs. This study theorizes that e-government helps autocrats reduce the threat of revolution from the public, but its anti-corruption properties increase the threat of a coup from elites. Analysis of three Central Asian cases, based on original interviews and open-source research, and a global statistical analyses establish a causal link between politics and digitalization. When elites are powerful, they resist e-government reforms that threaten their corruption income, and autocrats overcome this resistance only if the public threat outweighs the elite threat.KEYWORDS: e-governmentdigital governmentdigital authoritarianismauthoritarian politicscorruptionanti-corruption reformgovernanceCentral Asia AcknowledgementsI am immensely grateful to Nargis Kassenova, Sarah Hummel, and Alexandra Vacroux for their invaluable advice, feedback, and support throughout the research and writing process. This research would not have been possible without my interviewees, who generously gave me their time and expertise, and to whom I extend my deepest thanks. I would also like to thank Matt Andrews and Steve Worthington for their feedback on specific sections.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See, for example: Knox and Janenova, “The e-Government Paradox”; Gobel, “The Information Dilemma”; Ma et al., “E-government in China.”2 Park and Kim, “E-government as an Anti-corruption Tool,” and Bertot et al., “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of Transparency.”3 See, for example: Stier, “Political Determinants of E-government”; Kneuer and Harnisch, “Diffusion of e-Government;” Kardan and Sadeghiani, “Is e-Government a Way to e-Democracy?”4 This work builds on the simplified model of authoritarian politics developed in Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.5 Wintrobe, “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian.”6 Maerz, “The Electronic Face of Authoritarianism.”7 Chen et al., “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness”; Yan and Xin, “Reforming Governance Under Authoritarianism.”8 Polyakova and Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism.”9 de Mesquita et al., “Political Competition and Economic Growth.”10 Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise; Hale, Patronal Politics.11 The only discussion of corruption-driven resistance to e-government I could find in the literature were two brief mentions in Warf, e-Government in Asia, 7 and 122.12 Of course, this is not the only reason an e-government reform could fail: a lack of resources, human capital, and technological infrastructure could all impede reforms.13 Kyrgyzstan’s regime type is most debatable, but many international measures, like that of Freedom House, classify it as authoritarian during the period of study. Kyrgyzstan’s unique manifestation of authoritarianism, particularly its powerful public, makes it useful case. Kazakhstan, the wealthiest country in the region, has funded its projects by itself, while Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, poorer countries with similar GDP per capita, compensated by receiving substantial funding from international donors. Data compiled by the author on all donor-funded e-government programmes in Central Asia available on request.14 According to World Bank data, from 2017 to 2019, internet penetration jumped from 48% to 70% in Uzbekistan, and from 38% to 51% in Kyrgyzstan.15 They were held over Zoom for approximately one hour in Russian or English based on the interviewee’s preference.16 Interviewees who chose to be anonymous were not authorized by their organization to speak publicly and/or feared reprisal for criticizing the government.17 I did probe a few interviewees with more leading questions like “Who are the winners and losers of e-government initiatives?” I found that if interviewees did not spontaneously bring up corruption resistance, they would not mention it in response to more leading questions either.18 Sources available upon request.19 I sought information from relatively independent outlets, although the degree of independence varies by country: Gazeta.uz and Kun.uz in Uzbekistan; Vlast.kz in Kazakhstan; and Kaktus Media, Kloop, and 24.kg in Kyrgyzstan. Factual content and negative assessments of the government were also sourced from pro-government outlets.20 President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Об утвеждении стратегии «Цифровой Узбекистан-2030».21 Despite a Karimov-era requirement for comprehensive intra-governmental information sharing in the Law on Electronic Government, Mirziyoyev said that as of May 2020, only 30 of databases were integrated. UZA, “Шавкат Мирзиёев.”22 In his January 2020 address to Parliament, Mirziyoyev acknowledged the “organizational and institutional issues” with e-government. President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Послание Президента,” January 2020.23 Gazeta.uz, “Выступление премьер-министра.”24 Spot.uz, “Каким будет 2019 год в Узбекистане”; President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Послание Президента,” January 2020.25 Oxus Society, Central Asia Protest Tracker.26 Supporting this, a 2018 survey showed that over 60% of visitors to physical single-window service centres in Tashkent would have preferred to receive the service online, but they rated the functioning of the centres highly regardless. Gazeta.uz, “Ташкентцы оценили работу центров госуслуг.” Uzbek Expert #2 believes that the ICT community is weaker and less well organized than during the Karimov era. The Association of Information Technology Enterprises and Organizations of Uzbekistan was founded in in 2006, but it has not been operational since 2017, according to its website, www.ict.uz.27 Kassenova and Duprey, Digital Silk Road in Central Asia; Review.uz, “Узбекистан в строительстве «умных» городов.”28 Gazeta.uz, “Система онлайн-голосования.”29 Zakirov, “Authoritarian Regime Stability in Uzbekistan.”30 Lasslett, “Corruption and reform in Uzbekistan.”31 Interview with an Uzbek employee of an international organization; Eraliev, “Can Return Migration Be a ‘Brain Gain’.”32 President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Послание Президента,” December 2020.33 Gazeta.uz, “Декларирование доходов.”34 Salaydinov, “Распоряжения, противоречащие указу президента.”35 RFE/RL, “Companies Linked to Uzbek Government.”36 Goszakupka.uz, “Как сделать закупку.”37 Interview with Amelie Schurich-Rey, OECD Central Asia Policy Analyst.38 Electronic customs declarations were instated in 2012 under Karimov, but the process is still only partially automatic, according to a review of the official Customs Service website as of April 2022.39 President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Постановление.” The Commission’s website, nics.gov.uz, shows no activity after 2016.40 President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Указ о Государственной программе; Egov.kz, “Порталу eGov 9 лет.”41 Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Автоматизированы 82% госуслуг”; Digital Report, “Обзор законодательства.”42 President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Выступление Президента.”43 Interview with Krol; Kapital.kz, “В один клик.”44 Egov.kz, “Интересная статистика.”45 My.goz.uz, “Общая статистика.” As of January 2022, Uzbekistan’s my.gov.uz portal has 1.2 million registered users.46 Oxus Society, Central Asia Protest Tracker. The January 2022 protests, the country’s largest since independence, also demonstrate that there has been some public discontent simmering under the surface, and to extent the regime was aware of this, it created a higher degree of threat during the period of e-government development. Zhandayeva and Zhanmukanova, “Kazakhstan’s Instability.”47 Noks and Dzhanenova. “«Проклятие» электронного правительства.”48 Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, “Послание Президента;” President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Послание Президента,” 2007.49 Kassen, E-Government in Kazakhstan.50 Mamyshev, “Токаев поручил перенять у Китая опыт.”51 Rickleton, “Kazakhstan embraces facial recognition.”52 Gussarova, “Kazakhstan Experiments with Surveillance Technology.”53 Закон о внесении изменений и дополнений.54 Bohr, “Elections in Kazakhstan.”55 President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Послание Президента,” 2017.56 The World Bank, Assessment of the Public Procurement systems; OECD, Государственные закупки.57 The only example where there may have been elite-beneficiary corruption-driven resistance is digital asset declarations, as Toleugali posited. This was delayed several times since 2015. However, the system was implemented in 2021, starting with elites: ministers, parliament deputies, governors, and judges, among others, demonstrating that resistance, if there was any, has been overcome. Vlast.kz, “В Казахстане переносят сроки”; Ilyasov, “Всеобщая декларация.”58 Karavan, “С нас взятки гладки.”59 Smayyl, “Мусин снял на видео.”60 Satpayeva, “Катастрофа казахстанской медицины”; Tengri News, “Имитация цифровизации.”61 Asylbek, “Кланы взяли лакомые кусочки”; Vlast.kz, “Задержан бывший глава Минздрава.”62 Yusupova, “12 проектов.”63 Mamitova, “Госкомитет связи.”64 Kabar, “Жээнбеков.”65 Government of Kyrgyzstan, Распоряжение; Kudayarov, “Садыр Жапаров.”66 Nurmakov, “Оценки экспертов.”67 Quote from Sultanov.68 Comparable Uzbek and Kazakh laws use the softer term “transparency,” and do not forefront it as prominently.69 Kassenova and Duprey, Digital Silk Road in Central Asia.70 Tukhvatshin, “Самарагейт.”71 President of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Мы ставим амбициозную цель”; President of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Цифровизация была и остается приоритетным направлением.”72 In November 2021, the Vice Chair of the Cabinet of Ministers said that the government will no longer pay attention to social media commentary, acknowledging the important role the public has had thus far. Kalikov, “Больше не будет такого.”73 Podolskaya, “Кланы, олигархи, семейственность.”74 Akchurina, “Kyrgyzstan and Intermingling of Elites.”75 Aidar, “What We Know”; Dyatlenko, “Kyrgyz Elite.”76 Kutnaeva was the only interviewee who was not explicit that the elite resistance was due to corruption; she said the “sabotage” could be either the result of technical difficulty or people “just didn’t want it, whatever their reasons.”77 Kudryavtseva, “Премьер грозит налоговикам”; Kalikov, “Акылбек Жапаров пообещал.”78 President of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Цифровизация была и остается.”79 KTRK, “Проверка на дорогах.”80 Roziev, “Задержан статс-секретарь.”81 Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic, Постановление.82 Uraliyev, “Строительство дороги.”83 Korotkova “Нагрузка на бюджет.”84 Arikbaev, “Как в Чон-Алае скрыли.”85 Reznikova, “Кольца коррупции.”86 This captures the core of authoritarianism while allowing for variation on my independent variables, as other indices include factors that proxy the public threat, like strength of civil society. I used a cutoff score of 0.42, which most closely matches binary definitions of autocracy. Kasuya and Mori, “Better Regime Cutoffs.”87 These are measured by analysts responding to a standardized list of questions. Scores are relative to the countries with the most developed e-government, which controls for global technological progress. For modelling, the natural log was used because the values range from 0 to 1. United Nations, E-Government Knowledgebase.88 Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk.”89 Nardulli et al., The Coup d’Etat Project.90 A robustness check was also conducted using the number of years with a large protest in the past 10 years, consistent with the 10-year coup variable. This did not change the significance level of the protest variable for any model.91 Biggs came to this conclusion using datasets about democracies, the United States and United Kingdom. However, 10,000 is a widely-used cutoff for large protests in other countries as well. Biggs, “Size Matters”; see, for example: Schedler, “Disturbing the Dictator.”92 Clark and Regan, Mass Mobilization Protest Data.93 HCI measures the education level of the population with factors like adult literacy and average years of schooling. TTI is based on the percent of internet users and broadband and phone subscriptions per 100 people.94 Unfortunately, this caused some observation years from the five most authoritarian countries in the world, according to Freedom House, to be disproportionately dropped: Syria, South Sudan, Eritrea, Turkmenistan, and North Korea. Since this indicates a systematic reason for missing data, they cannot be imputed reliably.95 This model also controls for year as a fixed effect to further reduce autocorrelation.96 The model is robust to a binary measure of coup history; the coefficients are similar but somewhat less significant. The number of protests does not impact e-government, likely because small protests, even if they are numerous, do not pose a large threat to the regime.97 A 0.1 increase in TII leads to an increase in e-government scores between 0.04 and 0.15, depending on the model.98 I adopt no normative position on whether e-government in authoritarian countries is good. E-government has benefits for the public, but also benefits for autocratic regimes, a core tenet of this research.Additional informationFundingNo additional funding was used to support this research.Notes on contributorsKatrina KeeganKatrina Keegan is a Russia Subject Matter Expert at Two Six Technologies. She received her MA in Russian, Eastern European, and Central Asian Studies from Harvard University and her BA from University of Chicago. Her research focuses on how autocratic regimes use digital media and technologies.