Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433
Áron Hajnal
{"title":"The great experiment: why diverse democracies fall apart and how they can endure","authors":"Áron Hajnal","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47007554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2250985
Sergiu Gherghina, Petar Bankov
ABSTRACT Democratic backsliding has been halted in different countries around the world through various types of accountability. However, it is unclear what happens in political settings in which the usual accountability characteristics are absent. This article aims to explain how backsliding was stopped in 2021 in Bulgaria, which is an illustrative example of such a political setting. We illustrate how opposition political parties played a crucial role in halting democratic backsliding, through collaboration with each other and isolation of the government party. Our qualitative analysis uses data from media reports and public statements from the elites belonging to the parliamentary parties in the three Bulgarian parliaments of 2021. The novelty of our analysis lies in identifying a particular way of addressing democratic backsliding in countries in which the incumbent enjoys strong support and has been in office for a long period of time, and in presenting an alternative strategy to those which are often discussed in the literature. Instead of competing, political parties can cooperate to neutralize a common opponent and amplify the impact of other factors.
{"title":"Troublemakers and game changers: how political parties stopped democratic backsliding in Bulgaria","authors":"Sergiu Gherghina, Petar Bankov","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2250985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2250985","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Democratic backsliding has been halted in different countries around the world through various types of accountability. However, it is unclear what happens in political settings in which the usual accountability characteristics are absent. This article aims to explain how backsliding was stopped in 2021 in Bulgaria, which is an illustrative example of such a political setting. We illustrate how opposition political parties played a crucial role in halting democratic backsliding, through collaboration with each other and isolation of the government party. Our qualitative analysis uses data from media reports and public statements from the elites belonging to the parliamentary parties in the three Bulgarian parliaments of 2021. The novelty of our analysis lies in identifying a particular way of addressing democratic backsliding in countries in which the incumbent enjoys strong support and has been in office for a long period of time, and in presenting an alternative strategy to those which are often discussed in the literature. Instead of competing, political parties can cooperate to neutralize a common opponent and amplify the impact of other factors.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43788169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2251005
Egor Bronnikov
{"title":"Voicing Politics: How Language Shapes Public Opinion","authors":"Egor Bronnikov","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2251005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2251005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49613559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2250994
Noor J. E. Abushammalah
{"title":"Digital authoritarianism in the Middle East: deception, disinformation and social media","authors":"Noor J. E. Abushammalah","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2250994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2250994","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49198519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-25DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2246387
Mwita Chacha
ABSTRACT The proliferation of democratic rule in Africa has been accompanied by external involvement in fostering democracy. The African Union along with various regional organizations have included clauses in their treaties calling for member-state adherence to democratic governance. Moreover, African regional organizations have used punishments such as membership suspension, sanctions, and military force to motivate states experiencing democratic reversals to change course. However, despite these trends, there has been no investigation into how Africans perceive external involvement in fostering democracy. This study remedies this gap by evaluating public attitudes toward such external pressure using the sixth round of the Afrobarometer survey. Specifically, the study explores how individual assessment of electoral practice and a country's and its neighbours' history of unconstitutional changes of government influence approval of external democracy promotion. This article lays the foundation for further investigating the roots of legitimacy of actions taken by international organizations aimed at promoting good governance and democracy.
{"title":"Public attitudes towards external democracy promotion in Africa","authors":"Mwita Chacha","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2246387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2246387","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The proliferation of democratic rule in Africa has been accompanied by external involvement in fostering democracy. The African Union along with various regional organizations have included clauses in their treaties calling for member-state adherence to democratic governance. Moreover, African regional organizations have used punishments such as membership suspension, sanctions, and military force to motivate states experiencing democratic reversals to change course. However, despite these trends, there has been no investigation into how Africans perceive external involvement in fostering democracy. This study remedies this gap by evaluating public attitudes toward such external pressure using the sixth round of the Afrobarometer survey. Specifically, the study explores how individual assessment of electoral practice and a country's and its neighbours' history of unconstitutional changes of government influence approval of external democracy promotion. This article lays the foundation for further investigating the roots of legitimacy of actions taken by international organizations aimed at promoting good governance and democracy.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45991238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-22DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2246148
Karel Kouba, Jakub Lysek
ABSTRACT Even when robust competition becomes institutionalized for national elections in democracies, this is no guarantee that elections to subnational governments will be equally competitive there. This article documents a recent disconcerting worldwide return of “silent elections'' - electoral races in which citizens are unable to choose among political alternatives and their vote makes no difference to the outcome. Holding such uncontested elections clashes simultaneously with the dual dimensions of democratic government: contestation and inclusiveness. Eliminating any contestation whatsoever not only skews democratic representation but is also expected to have a devastating effect on citizen participation. Leveraging a large dataset of 6,254 Czech municipalities in seven municipal elections between 1998 and 2022, the main contributions of this article are assessing the extent of the problem of silent elections over time, understanding its root causes, estimating its effect on turnout and exploring what mechanisms drive the nexus between uncontested elections and voter participation. The steady rise in the proportion of uncontested races (28% of all municipalities by 2022) as well as their staggering and increasing estimated effect on turnout (17 points relative to contested) point towards a thus far unnoticed deficit of local democracy.
{"title":"The return of silent elections: democracy, uncontested elections and citizen participation in Czechia","authors":"Karel Kouba, Jakub Lysek","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2246148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2246148","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Even when robust competition becomes institutionalized for national elections in democracies, this is no guarantee that elections to subnational governments will be equally competitive there. This article documents a recent disconcerting worldwide return of “silent elections'' - electoral races in which citizens are unable to choose among political alternatives and their vote makes no difference to the outcome. Holding such uncontested elections clashes simultaneously with the dual dimensions of democratic government: contestation and inclusiveness. Eliminating any contestation whatsoever not only skews democratic representation but is also expected to have a devastating effect on citizen participation. Leveraging a large dataset of 6,254 Czech municipalities in seven municipal elections between 1998 and 2022, the main contributions of this article are assessing the extent of the problem of silent elections over time, understanding its root causes, estimating its effect on turnout and exploring what mechanisms drive the nexus between uncontested elections and voter participation. The steady rise in the proportion of uncontested races (28% of all municipalities by 2022) as well as their staggering and increasing estimated effect on turnout (17 points relative to contested) point towards a thus far unnoticed deficit of local democracy.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44583714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-20DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2246127
K. Melnikov
ABSTRACT The instrumental use of patronage for political appointments and career advancement can be found across all regime types and historical periods. Despite a pronounced academic interest in the political and economic effects of patron-client relationships, little is known about the nature of interplay between informal networks and formal hierarchies. How are formal powers distributed in personalized bureaucracies? The article addresses this question through a cross-temporal case study of subnational government in one of Russia’s regions – Sverdlovsk Oblast. Based on network analysis and negative binomial regression, the article shows that subnational leaders and their clienteles seek to monopolize those formal powers that allow administrative control over other executive agencies, while other coercive, financial, and normative powers are distributed relatively evenly. This pattern persists regardless of institutional context, degree of subnational autonomy, or the shape of informal networks, which signifies the importance of controlling functions that the core of informal networks in personalized bureaucracies performs.
{"title":"Formal power in informal networks. Distribution of power resources in personalized bureaucracies: the case of Russia’s subnational elites","authors":"K. Melnikov","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2246127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2246127","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The instrumental use of patronage for political appointments and career advancement can be found across all regime types and historical periods. Despite a pronounced academic interest in the political and economic effects of patron-client relationships, little is known about the nature of interplay between informal networks and formal hierarchies. How are formal powers distributed in personalized bureaucracies? The article addresses this question through a cross-temporal case study of subnational government in one of Russia’s regions – Sverdlovsk Oblast. Based on network analysis and negative binomial regression, the article shows that subnational leaders and their clienteles seek to monopolize those formal powers that allow administrative control over other executive agencies, while other coercive, financial, and normative powers are distributed relatively evenly. This pattern persists regardless of institutional context, degree of subnational autonomy, or the shape of informal networks, which signifies the importance of controlling functions that the core of informal networks in personalized bureaucracies performs.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43066524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-20DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2232741
Aykut Öztürk
ABSTRACT Economic explanations are central to our understanding of popular support for authoritarian regimes. Yet, we do not know to what extent economic evaluations of citizens living under these regimes are amenable to regime propaganda. This article engages with this question by relying on the case of Turkey, where the authoritarian regime led by Erdoğan has been able to sustain its popular support despite years of economic decline. A national developmentalist narrative has been central to the regime’s economic propaganda in Turkey since 2011. Relying on national face-to-face survey data, I first demonstrate that economic misperceptions grounded in this narrative are widespread among supporters of the ruling coalition in Turkey. I then use an online survey experiment to show that exposure to the developmentalist narrative improves economic evaluations among ruling coalition voters. These effects are mediated through the increase in partisan emotions, and they are especially large for non-partisan voters of the ruling coalition. These results help us understand how Erdoğan’s regime could sustain its popular support despite years of economic decline. From a broader perspective, this article demonstrates that scholars of authoritarian regimes need to pay more attention to economic narratives and their affective structures.
{"title":"Whisper sweet nothings to me Erdoğan: developmentalist propaganda, partisan emotions, and economic evaluations in Turkey","authors":"Aykut Öztürk","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2232741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2232741","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Economic explanations are central to our understanding of popular support for authoritarian regimes. Yet, we do not know to what extent economic evaluations of citizens living under these regimes are amenable to regime propaganda. This article engages with this question by relying on the case of Turkey, where the authoritarian regime led by Erdoğan has been able to sustain its popular support despite years of economic decline. A national developmentalist narrative has been central to the regime’s economic propaganda in Turkey since 2011. Relying on national face-to-face survey data, I first demonstrate that economic misperceptions grounded in this narrative are widespread among supporters of the ruling coalition in Turkey. I then use an online survey experiment to show that exposure to the developmentalist narrative improves economic evaluations among ruling coalition voters. These effects are mediated through the increase in partisan emotions, and they are especially large for non-partisan voters of the ruling coalition. These results help us understand how Erdoğan’s regime could sustain its popular support despite years of economic decline. From a broader perspective, this article demonstrates that scholars of authoritarian regimes need to pay more attention to economic narratives and their affective structures.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"30 1","pages":"1357 - 1379"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43251327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-14DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2243227
Sujay Ghosh
{"title":"Justice by means of democracy","authors":"Sujay Ghosh","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2243227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2243227","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48080302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2241379
D. Jones
ABSTRACT Since 2010, waves of protest have ebbed and now largely faded across the Arab states of the Middle East, and authoritarian politics there appear to be stronger than ever. Has dissent disappeared, or merely become harder to notice? I argue in this article that clientelism serves as an important locus of latent dissent in the Middle East, one that calls into question the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, though it often happens away from public view. Employing data from four waves of the Arab Barometer, however, I show that the more citizens perceive clientelism to be prevalent in society, the less likely they are to willingly obey their government when they disagree with it. This finding is most pronounced among those most on the fence about obeying the government in the first place, and during periods in which overt dissent is least apparent. Clientelism beliefs also increase support for democratic alternatives in the most recent data. In addition, while clientelism should increase voting and election-related mobilization, I find inconsistent results across time. This article complicates our current understanding of the role clientelism plays in authoritarian states, and it sheds new light on the “client side” of the patron-client relationship.
{"title":"Challenging the rules of the game: clientelism and dissent in the Middle East","authors":"D. Jones","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2241379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2241379","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since 2010, waves of protest have ebbed and now largely faded across the Arab states of the Middle East, and authoritarian politics there appear to be stronger than ever. Has dissent disappeared, or merely become harder to notice? I argue in this article that clientelism serves as an important locus of latent dissent in the Middle East, one that calls into question the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, though it often happens away from public view. Employing data from four waves of the Arab Barometer, however, I show that the more citizens perceive clientelism to be prevalent in society, the less likely they are to willingly obey their government when they disagree with it. This finding is most pronounced among those most on the fence about obeying the government in the first place, and during periods in which overt dissent is least apparent. Clientelism beliefs also increase support for democratic alternatives in the most recent data. In addition, while clientelism should increase voting and election-related mobilization, I find inconsistent results across time. This article complicates our current understanding of the role clientelism plays in authoritarian states, and it sheds new light on the “client side” of the patron-client relationship.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49340637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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