{"title":"Chief executive officer private firm experience and idiosyncratic risk","authors":"Dev R. Mishra","doi":"10.1111/corg.12556","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>We examine chief executive officers' (CEOs) lifetime work experience in private firms and its potential influence in shaping managers' style in public firms and their corporate policies and thus the market's perception of a firm's risk.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>We find that the idiosyncratic risk of public firms increases with the extent of CEO work experience in privately owned firms (<i>CEO private experience</i>). While there is no evidence of higher investment risk taking by private CEOs, the proportion of private-firm work experience has a positive association with disclosure deficiency, decrease in manager-owner agency conflicts, and an increase in political risk revelations at earnings conference calls, which, in turn, are associated with the elevation of idiosyncratic risk.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>The findings of this study underscore arguments in the upper echelons theory, imprinting theory, and behavioral agency theory. The study also has implications for literature related to corporate disclosure, governance, and political risk.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Idiosyncratic risk is important for firms, as the literature suggests it hurts a firm's ability to finance future capital investments; therefore, it is optimal for corporate boards to have strategies in place to monitor and offer orientation packages targeted at alleviating CEO style heterogeneities presented by their prior work experience in private firms.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 3","pages":"567-589"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12556","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Research Question/Issue
We examine chief executive officers' (CEOs) lifetime work experience in private firms and its potential influence in shaping managers' style in public firms and their corporate policies and thus the market's perception of a firm's risk.
Research Findings/Insights
We find that the idiosyncratic risk of public firms increases with the extent of CEO work experience in privately owned firms (CEO private experience). While there is no evidence of higher investment risk taking by private CEOs, the proportion of private-firm work experience has a positive association with disclosure deficiency, decrease in manager-owner agency conflicts, and an increase in political risk revelations at earnings conference calls, which, in turn, are associated with the elevation of idiosyncratic risk.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
The findings of this study underscore arguments in the upper echelons theory, imprinting theory, and behavioral agency theory. The study also has implications for literature related to corporate disclosure, governance, and political risk.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
Idiosyncratic risk is important for firms, as the literature suggests it hurts a firm's ability to finance future capital investments; therefore, it is optimal for corporate boards to have strategies in place to monitor and offer orientation packages targeted at alleviating CEO style heterogeneities presented by their prior work experience in private firms.
期刊介绍:
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.